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This paper presents a game semantics for LP, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs. The language of LP
extends that of propositional logic by adding formula-labeling terms, permitting us to take
a term t and an LP formula A and form the new formula t :A. We deﬁne a game semantics
for this logic that interprets terms as winning strategies on the formulas they label, so t :A
may be read as “t is a winning strategy on A.” LP may thus be seen as a logic containing
in-language descriptions of winning strategies on its own formulas.
We apply our semantics to show how winnable instances of certain extensive games
with perfect information may be embedded into LP. This allows us to use LP to derive
a winning strategy on the embedding, from which we can extract a winning strategy on
the original, non-embedded game. As a concrete illustration of this method, we compute a
winning strategy for a winnable instance of the well-known game Nim.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Propositional Veriﬁcation is a game played by two players, who we call True and False. The game requires two input
parameters: a formula A in the language of propositional logic and a background model M that interprets atomic formulas.
To play the game, the players begin on the formula A and take turns choosing an immediate subformula instance of the
current formula, with True choosing at those subformula instances of A that are either positive non-conjunctions or else
negative conjunctions and False choosing at those subformula instances of A that are either negative non-conjunctions or
else positive conjunctions. (Special case: if A contains no conjunctions, then True chooses at positive subformula instances of
A and False chooses at negative subformula instances of A.) In this way, the players choose immediate subformula instances
of the current formula until an atomic formula p is reached, at which point the game is over. True wins in two cases: (1) if p
is true inM and positive in A, or (2) if p is false inM and negative in A. False wins exactly when True loses.
Propositional Veriﬁcation can be used to deﬁne a notion of truth for propositional formulas: to sayA is true in a background
model M means that True has a winning strategy in the Propositional Veriﬁcation Game on Awith background modelM. In
this context, a strategy is just a function that speciﬁes the choices True shouldmakewhen it is his turn tomove, and awinning
strategy is a strategy that True can follow so as to guarantee himself a win, no matter the moves of False. The notion of truth
can then be extended to a notion of validity: call a formula valid exactly when the formula is true in every backgroundmodel.
In this way, we obtain a game semantics for classical propositional logic.
Propositional Veriﬁcation may be extended to the language of ﬁrst-order logic, yielding a First-Order Veriﬁcation Game.1
Hintikka and Sandu introduced partial information extensions of First-Order Veriﬁcation in order to provide a semantics for
Independence-Friendly (or IF) logic, a logic that allows for arbitrary dependencies between quantiﬁers and logical connectives
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1 The basic ideas of this extension go back to Peirce [1,2].
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in a ﬁrst-order language [3]. Research in IF logics has centered on identifying these dependencies and understanding their
inﬂuences on logic (see Sandu’s paper [4] for a ﬂavor of this work).
Veriﬁcation Games have been used to provide semantics for many other logics, including intuitionistic logic and modal
logic (see Hodges’ overview of games in logic [5]).
In this paper, we deﬁne a game semantics for the logic LP, Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [6]. LP is a conservative extension
of classical propositional logic with a language obtained from that of propositional logic by adding formula-labeling terms.
If t is such a term and A is an LP formula, then t :A is also an LP formula. Terms have a structure that mimics deduction
in the system in the sense of Artemov’s Internalization Theorem: each LP theorem A has a term t such that t :A is also an
LP theorem [6]. It is in this sense we say that LP internalizes its theorems—thereby providing a reason for each theorem’s
veracity—leading us to the informal reading of t :A as “A for reason t.” Extensions and variations of this in-language notion
of justiﬁcation have recently been used for studying evidence and justiﬁcation from an epistemic perspective, leading to the
study of a family of logics grouped together under the name Justiﬁcation Logic [7–15].
This paperdeﬁnes a gamesemantics for oneof thebasic Justiﬁcation Logics,LP itself. Our gamesemantics adds to the list of
known semantics for LP, which presently includes an arithmetic semantics [6], a minimal semantics [16], and a Kripke-style
semantics [17]. We deﬁne this game semantics by extending Propositional Veriﬁcation to the language of LP, interpreting
LP terms as winning strategies on the formulas they label. We may thus assign to the LP formula t :A the informal reading
“t is a winning strategy on A.”
Since terms are interpreted as winning strategies in LP Veriﬁcation, the LP Internalization Theorem implies that winning
strategies in LPVeriﬁcation can be describedwithin the LPVeriﬁcationGame itself.Wewill use this in the end of the paper to
show how the existence of a winning-strategy–preserving embedding of certain extensive games of perfect information into
Propositional Veriﬁcation (and hence into LP Veriﬁcation) allows us to use the Internalization Theorem to build a winning
strategy on the embedded version of a winnable game instance, from which we can then extract a winning strategy on the
original, non-embedded game instance itself. For concreteness, we will use this method at the end of the paper to extract a
winning strategy for a winnable instance of the well-known game of Nim [18].
But before we can do any of this, we must ﬁrst describe LP and its game semantics. So let us begin by introducing LP,
Artemov’s Logic of Proofs [6].
2. The language and theory of LP
For present purposes, the language of propositional logic consists of a countable number of propositional letters, the
propositional constant  for truth, the propositional constant ⊥ for falsehood, and the following logical connectives: binary
implication (written ⊃), binary conjunction (written ∧), binary disjunction (written ∨), and unary negation (written ¬).
The atoms, also called atomic formulas, consist of the propositional letters and the propositional constants. The propositional
formulas are obtained in the usual way from the atoms using the logical connectives.
To say that a formula is conjunctive means that the formula is of the form B ∧ C, and to say that a formula is non-
conjunctivemeans that the formula is not conjunctive. Further, a conjunction is a conjunctive formula, and a non-conjunction
is a non-conjunctive formula.
The language of LP is obtained from that of propositional logic by adding a countable number of constant symbols, a
countable number of variable symbols, the binary function symbols + and ·, and the unary function symbol !. The atomic
terms consist of the constants and the variables. Terms are built-up from the atomic terms using the function symbols.
Notation 2.1. The letters t, u, and v will be used as metavariables ranging over terms.
The LP formulas are obtained from the propositional formulas by closure under both the rules of propositional formula
formation and also the following rule: if A is an LP formula and t is a term, then t :A is also an LP formula. In the remainder
of the paper, unqualiﬁed use of the word formula refers to an LP formula.
Notation 2.2. Use of letters as metavariables:
• A, B, C, and Dwill be used for formulas.
• pwill be used for atoms (propositional letters, , or ⊥).
Deﬁnition 2.3. The theory of LP is given as follows.
• Axiom Schemes
LP0. Axiom schemes for classical propositional logic
LP1. u :(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(
v :A ⊃ (u · v) :B
)
LP2. u :A ⊃ !u :(u :A)
LP3. u :A ∨ v :A ⊃ (u + v) :A
LP4. u :A ⊃ A
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• Rule of Modus Ponens: if A ⊃ B and A are provable, then B is provable.
• Rule of Constant Necessitation: if c is a constant and A is an axiom of LP, then c :A is provable.
The intended reading of the formula t :A is “t is a proof of A” [6]. Here we are to think of the term t as an abstract
representation of an actual proof in the theory LP of the formula A. Let us see how the LP-speciﬁc axiom schemes and rules
provide an intuitive support for this reading.
• Theschemeu :(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(
v :A ⊃ (u · v) :B
)
says that in caseu is aproofof an implicationandv is aproofof that implication’s
antecedent, then u · v is a proof of that implication’s consequent. So the function symbol · is used to represent applications
of Modus Ponens.
• The scheme u :A ⊃ !u :(u :A) says that if u is a proof of A, then !u checks that u is indeed a proof of A. So the function symbol
! provides a means of verifying a proof assertion.
• The scheme u :A ∨ v :A ⊃ (u + v) :A says that if one or more of u and v is a proof of A, then u + v is also a proof of A. So the
function symbol + is a monotonic combination of proofs, in that u + v proves all those things proved by either u or v.
• The scheme u :A ⊃ A says that if u is a proof of A, then A is true. This tells us that our system of proof is veridical: anything
that is proven is in fact true.
• The rule of Constant Necessitation says that we use constants as unanalyzed proofs of our most basic assertions, the
axioms.
The following theorem, due toArtemov [6], describes theway inwhich LP is able to reason about its ownproofs. This theorem
bolsters the intuitive reading of t :A as “t is a proof of A.”
Theorem 2.4 (Artemov’s Internalization Theorem [6]). For each LP theorem A, there is a term t such that t :A is also an LP
theorem. Further, the term t does not contain variables.
Proof. By induction on the length of a derivation of A. In case A is an axiom, then, letting c be a constant, c :A is an LP theorem
by Constant Necessitation. Otherwise, if A is not an axiom, then A is obtained by Modus Ponens or Constant Necessitation.
If A is obtained from the theorems B ⊃ A and B by Modus Ponens, then the induction hypothesis yields variable-free terms
u and v such that u :(B ⊃ A) and v :B are both theorems, and so it follows by LP1 and Modus Ponens that (u · v) :A is also a
theorem. If c :A is obtained by Constant Necessitation, it follows by LP2 and Modus Ponens that !c :(c :A) is a theorem. 
While we have focused on the reading “t is a proof of A” for the formula t :A, it will be our task now to describe how this
formula may also be read as “t is a winning strategy on A.” To make sense of the latter reading, we will deﬁne a two-player
game called the LP Veriﬁcation Game. A formula will be used to generate the game board for a particular play of the LP
Veriﬁcation Game, and terms will be used as schematic descriptions of strategies in the game. We will then see that if the
strategies described by the terms respect the axiomatics of LP, then we are guaranteed that the formula t :A is provable in
LP if and only if t is a schematic description of a winning strategy on the board generated by A. This will justify our reading
t :A as “t is a winning strategy on A.”
3. Pebble games with explicit strategies
The LP Veriﬁcation Game is based on a rather simple game that we call the pebble game.2 The pebble game is a game
played by two players. The game board consists of a ﬁnite tree that has had a pebble placed at its root and has had each of
its nodes labeled by the name of one or the other of the players. The game is then played in the following way. If the pebble
is located on a leaf, then the game is over, and the player whose name is written on that leaf wins. If the pebble is located
on a non-leaf, then the player whose name is written on that non-leaf must move the pebble to a child of that non-leaf. In
this way, the players move the pebble in a sequence of parent-to-child moves until a leaf is ﬁnally reached. The object of the
game is for a player to have this ﬁnal leaf be one on which his name is written.
Example 3.1. Fig. 1 is a pebble game for players  and ⊥. The board consists of twelve nodes, n0 through n11, each of which
is labeled by the name of one or the other of the players. Concerning the leaves: nodes n10, n8, and n6 are winning positions
for , while nodes n11 and n5 are winning positions for ⊥. Concerning the non-leaves: nodes n0, n1, n7 and n9 are positions
at which  must make a move, while nodes n2, n3, and n4 are positions at which ⊥ must make a move. So an example play
of the game might go as follows. The pebble begins at the root n0. Since n0 is labeled by , player  gets the ﬁrst move. To
make this move, player  must move the pebble to a child of n0. So suppose player  moves the pebble from n0 to the child
n1. The pebble then rests on n1 and, since this node is also labeled by , player  must again make a move. To make this
move, player  must move the pebble from n1 to a child of n1. So suppose player  moves the pebble from n1 to the child
2 The pebble game is not our creation; it is in fact a certain kind of extensive game with perfect information [19] (see Section 6 for details). Pebble games
and adaptations of pebble games have been used to deﬁne game semantics for a number of logics [3,5].
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Fig. 1. A pebble game for players  and ⊥.
n3. The pebble then rests on n3 and, since this node is labeled by ⊥, player ⊥ must make a move. To make this move, player
⊥ must move the pebble from n3 to a child of n3. So suppose player ⊥ moves the pebble from n3 to the child n5. The pebble
then rests on n5, which is a leaf and hence the game is over with player⊥ the winner by the fact that n5 is labeled by⊥. Note
that this sequence n0,n1,n3,n5 is only one of ﬁve possible plays that can occur in this particular pebble game. (The other
four plays are obtained by taking each of the leaves other than n5 and then enumerating a parent-to-child sequence of nodes
that begins at the root n0 and ends at the chosen leaf.)
A variation of the pebble game, which we call the pebble game with explicit strategies, describes the essential underlying
structure of the LP Veriﬁcation Game. So let us now discuss the pebble game with explicit strategies.
Take a game board of the pebble game. This game board consists of a ﬁnite tree that has had each of its nodes labeled by
the name of one or the other of the players. Intuitively, for a player to play by a strategy, he is to make his moves according
to a preconceived plan. This plan simply speciﬁes a move for the player to make at each of those positions at which he must
make a move. This leads us to the following formal deﬁnition: for a player P and a game board G, a strategy for P in G is a
function that maps each P-labeled non-leaf in G to a child of that non-leaf.3 And for a P-labeled node n in G, a strategy for P
at n is a function that maps each non-leaf P-labeled descendant of n to a child of that non-leaf descendant. Important point:
we adopt the convention that a node is not a descendant of itself ; accordingly, if a node n is labeled by P, then a strategy for
player P at a node n does not provide a move for P at the node n itself.
Remark 3.2. We have made a distinction between the notion of a strategy in a pebble game and the notion of a strategy at a
node in a pebble game. To see the difference, observe that a strategy in a pebble game speciﬁes a move at every node in the
game at which the player could possibly have to move; in particular, a strategy for P in a pebble game G will specify a move
at the root of Gwhenever the root is labeled by P. In contrast, a strategy at a node n in a pebble game G only speciﬁes a move
at the descendants of n in G; in particular, a strategy at the root of G does not specify a move at the root (because the root
is not a descendant of itself). We distinguish these two notions of strategy for technical reasons, and we will point out later
where it is that this distinction arises. But for now our focus will be on the notion of strategy at a node.
Example 3.3. Consider the following description of choices to be made by player  in the pebble game from Fig. 1:
• at node n1, choose the child n2;
• at node n7, choose the child n9;
• at node n9, choose the child n10.
3 Notice that we require strategies to be complete, in the sense that they must tell the player what to do in every position at which he might possibly
have to move. Thus a strategy must say what to do for every possible play of the game, not just for a particular play (in which some positions may not be
reached). As an example: in the pebble game from Fig. 1, a strategy for player  must choose a child of node n9 even if this very strategy chooses the child
n3 of the node n1 as its second move (a move that makes it impossible for the pebble to ever land on node n9).
This choice of complete strategies is not essential to our setup; indeed, in weighing the consequences of having non-complete strategies (more complexity
in the notion of strategy, less complexity in specifying particular strategies) versus having complete strategies (less complexity in the notion of strategy,
more complexity in specifying particular strategies), we chose the latter route in the interest of keeping our basic concepts as simple as possible. But this
choice could have easily been made the other way around.
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Let us see that this description is a strategy for player at the root n0; that is, we are to show that this description speciﬁes a
function that maps each non-leaf descendant of n0 that is labeled by to a child of that non-leaf descendant. Wewill do this
by observing three points. First, our description clearly speciﬁes a function by the fact that it does not specify two different
choices for one and the same node. Second, for each of the nodes for which our description makes a choice, the choice is
always a child of the given node. Third, of the non-leaf -labeled nodes that are descendants of n0—which, by inspection of
Fig. 1, consist of n1, n7, and n9—our description makes a choice at each such node. (Recall that a node is a not descendant of
itself and so n0 is a not a descendant of n0.) Taken together, these three points show that our description is indeed a strategy
for player  at the root n0.
Example 3.4. Consider the following description of choices to be made by player ⊥ in the pebble game from Fig. 1:
• at node n4, choose the child n7.
By an argument similar to that in Example 3.3, we have that this description is a strategy for player ⊥ at the node n2; that is,
this description speciﬁes a function that maps each non-leaf descendant of n2 that is labeled by ⊥ to a child of that non-leaf
descendant.
Example 3.5. Consider the following description of choices to be made by player  in the pebble game from Fig. 1:
• at node n9, choose the child n11.
By an argument similar to that in Example 3.3, we have that this description is a strategy for player  at the node n7; that is,
this description speciﬁes a function that maps each non-leaf descendant of n7 that is labeled by  to a child of that non-leaf
descendant.
The reader has perhaps observed that our deﬁnitions of strategy in a pebble game and strategy at a node in a pebble game
do not rule out the empty strategy, which we deﬁne as the empty function (that is, the function whose domain is empty).
In fact, the empty strategy is a strategy in any one-node pebble game G because there are no non-leaves in G. Similarly, the
empty strategy is a strategy at any node satisfying the property that each of the node’s children is a leaf; after all, such a node
has no non-leaf descendants. The reader bored by this discussion of the empty strategy need not worry: while this concept
may come up from time to time, it will not be of signiﬁcant concern to us beyond the paragraph we have just ﬁnished.
Let us extend the labeling of game board nodes in the following way: if a node n is labeled by the player P—meaning that
player P either wins at n (if n is a leaf) or that player P must move at n (if n is a non-leaf)—then n may also be labeled by a
strategy for P at n.4 Now consider the following rule, called the Strategy Rule: if the pebble lands on a node n labeled by a
strategy s for a player, then s controls the player’s moves at the descendants of n. Adding this rule to the list of rules of the
basic pebble game has the following effect: a player is allowed to make his moves however he wishes as long as the pebble
has not yet landed on a node labeled by one of his strategies; however, once the pebble does land on a node n labeled by one
of his strategies, then this strategy thereafter completely controls his moves at the descendants of n.
Example 3.6. Let s0 be the strategy for player  at node n0 deﬁned in Example 3.3 and let s2 be the strategy for player ⊥
at node n2 deﬁned in Example 3.4. Now consider the game board in Fig. 2. In this game, the pebble begins at the root n0.
Since n0 is labeled by  and by the strategy s0, the Strategy Rule applies: s0 controls player ’s moves at the descendants of
n0. Since n0 is not a descendant of itself (recall our convention that a node is not a descendant of itself), player  still has
to choose his move at n0, though the fact that n0 has only one child ends up trivializing this choice. So player  moves the
pebble from n0 to the child n1. Since n1 is labeled by , it is again player ’s turn to move. But n1 is a -labeled descendant
of n0 and so the Strategy Rule has s0 make the move at this node: s0 moves the pebble from n1 to the child n2 (in accordance
with the deﬁnition of s0 from Example 3.3). Since n2 is labeled by ⊥ and by s2, the Strategy Rule again applies: s2 controls
player ⊥’s moves at the descendants of n2. Since n2 is not a descendant of itself, player ⊥ still has to choose his move at n2,
though his choice is similarly trivialized, so he moves n2 to the child n4. Since n4 is labeled by ⊥, it is player ⊥’s turn again.
But n4 is a ⊥-labeled descendant of n2 and so the Strategy Rule has s2 make the move: s2 moves the pebble from n4 to the
child n7 (in accordancewith the deﬁnition of s2 from Example 3.5). But n7 is a-labeled descendant of n0 and so the Strategy
Rule has s0 make the move at this node: s0 moves the pebble from n7 to the child n9 (in accordance with the deﬁnition of s0
from Example 3.3). Since n9 is also a -labeled descendant of n0, the Strategy Rule again has s0 make the move: s0 moves
the pebble from n9 to the child n10 (also in accordance with the deﬁnition of s0 from Example 3.3). Since n10 is a leaf, the
game is over with player  the winner by the fact that n10 is labeled by .
4 It is not quite correct for us to say that a node is labeled by a strategy; we should instead say that a node is labeled by the name of a strategy. But the
distinction between these two statements is not important for what follows, so, in the interest of brevity, wewill generally conﬂate a strategywith its name.
(For the same reason, we have also at times conﬂated players with their names, a practice that we will continue when we ﬁnd it both convenient and also
unlikely to cause confusion.)
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Fig. 2. A pebble game with explicit strategies for players  and ⊥.
Fig. 3. A pebble game with explicit strategies for players  and ⊥.
Perhaps the reader has realized that if we do not place additional restrictions on how nodes may be labeled by strategies,
then the Strategy Rule can run afoul of itself. To see why, suppose that the pebble lands on a node n labeled by a strategy s for
a player. Applying the Strategy Rule, the strategy s then controls how the player plays at the descendants of n. But in playing
the remainder of the game, the pebble might land on another node n′ that is labeled by yet another strategy s′ for the same
player. By another application of the Strategy Rule, the strategy s′ then also controls how the player plays the game at the
descendants of n′, which are themselves descendants of n. Since each of the strategies s and s′ is to control how the player
plays at the descendants of n′, a problemmay arise in the following way. If the pebble should end up on a descendant of n′ at
which the player in question must make a move and the strategies s and s′ disagree as to the move to make, then any move
will violate at least one of the strategies s or s′. In such a situation, it impossible for the player to act in compliance with the
Strategy Rule.
Example 3.7. Let s0 be the strategy for player at node n0 deﬁned in Example 3.3, let s2 be the strategy for player⊥ at node
n2 deﬁned in Example 3.4, and let s7 be the strategy for player  at node n7 deﬁned in Example 3.5. Now consider the game
board in Fig. 3. Suppose the game has been played so that the pebble has reached node n9. The pebble was thus moved from
n0 to n1 to n2 to n4 to n7 to n9 (observe that each of these moves is in accord with the Strategy Rule). Since the pebble rests
on n9, it is then player ’s turn to play, except that now each of the strategies s0 and s7 is to control his moves his moves
according to the Strategy Rule because n9 is a -labeled descendant of both n0 and n7. But here we have a problem: strategy
s0 chooses the child n10, whereas strategy s7 chooses the child n11. Since no choice of a child of n9 can satisfy each of these
strategies, no choice of a child of n9 will be in compliance with the Strategy Rule.
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We wish to avoid such situations in which it is impossible for a player to act in compliance with the Strategy Rule. In
so doing, we want to keep the general spirit of our initial setup, by which we mean that we will not investigate “exotic”
solutions that call for non-trivial mechanisms that negotiate an agreement between conﬂicting strategies. This leaves us
with two routes we may take to solve the problem of strategy conﬂicts.
The ﬁrst route is to simply forbid all strategy labelings that result in strategy conﬂicts. Formally, thismeans thatwhenever
a node n labeled by player P and by strategy s has a descendant n′ labeled by player P and by strategy s′, then strategies s and
s′ must agree on all descendants of n′. Said informally, whenever two or more strategies are to control a player’s moves, they
must all together agree on themoves that theplayer is tomake.While this restrictiondoes eliminate thepossibility of strategy
conﬂicts, it has the unfortunate consequence of diminishing the role of later-encountered strategies. After all, a strategy says
how the player is to play the remainder of the game, so once one strategy has been encountered, this strategy then completely
determines themoves that any subsequently encountered strategiesmay choose.We ﬁnd this undesirable—especially in the
speciﬁc context of the to-be-deﬁned LP Veriﬁcation Game—so we will not pursue this ﬁrst route.
Example 3.8. Suppose we were to adopt the ﬁrst route, whereby we forbid all strategy labelings that result in strategy
conﬂicts. The labeling in Fig. 3 with strategies deﬁned as in Example 3.7 would then be forbidden because we showed
in Example 3.7 that this labeling can lead to a strategy conﬂict. We could of course change the labeling in Fig. 3 so as to
eliminate strategy conﬂicts. In particular, we could replace the strategies s0 and s7 by other strategies such that the resulting
labeling would have no conﬂicts. In doing this, we might like to leave strategy s0 in place because it takes player  to one
of his winning positions. This reduces the problem to one of ﬁnding a strategy s′7 to replace s7 in order to produce a board
without strategy conﬂicts. But now notice that these two goals—keeping s0 as part of the labeling (goal one) and choosing
s′7 so as to eliminate strategy conﬂicts (goal two)—together determine the strategy s
′
7. Namely, s
′
7 is the strategy obtained
by restricting the domain of s0 to the descendants of n7; that is, s
′
7 must move at node n9 as does s0. It is in this way that
the earlier-encountered strategy s0 completely determines the later-encountered strategy s
′
7, thereby diminishing the role
of this later-encountered strategy. Since we ﬁnd this phenomenon undesirable, we will not pursue this route.
The second route one may take to solve the problem of strategy conﬂicts—and it is this route that we will take—is to limit
the scope of a strategy’s control over a player’s moves so as to guarantee that no more than one strategy is in control of a
player’smoves at any given time. To do this,wewill replace the Strategy Rulewith a new rule called the StrategyHandOff Rule:
if the pebble lands on a node n labeled by a strategy s for a player, then control of the player’s moves at the descendants of n is
immediately relinquished to strategy s, no matter whether it was another strategy or the player himself that previously had
control of the player’s moves at these descendants. So we see that the Strategy Hand Off Rule has the player or any strategy
that is controlling a player’s moves “hand off” its control at descendant nodes to the next-encountered strategy for that same
player.
The Strategy Hand Off Rule guarantees that at most one strategy will be in control of a player’s moves at any given time.
This eliminates the possibility of strategy conﬂicts because such conﬂicts can only arise in situations in which two or more
strategies simultaneously control a player’s moves. In addition, the Strategy Hand Off Rule does not have the undesirable
propertywhereby theﬁrst-encountered strategy for a player diminishes the role of a later-encountered strategy for that same
player (in the sense that the ﬁrst-encountered strategy completely determines the later-encountered strategy, as described
above). In fact, a later-encountered strategy will still have a genuine role to play, in that it will also get its chance to control.
Example 3.9. Consider again the game board in Fig. 3, with the strategies s0, s2, and s7 deﬁned respectively as in Examples
3.3–3.5. Let us now examine how the game is played when the rules consist of those for the basic pebble game in addition
to the Strategy Hand Off Rule. In this game, the pebble proceeds as in Example 3.7 from the root n0 to the node n7; after all,
the effects of the Strategy Hand Off Rule and of the Strategy Rule coincide up to the point where the pebble reaches node
n7. But then there is a crucial difference: since n7 is labeled by  and by strategy s7, the Strategy Hand Off Rule relinquishes
control of ’s moves at the descendants of n7 to the strategy s7. So we see that at n7, the strategy s0 still gets to move (since
n7 is not a descendant of itself), so s0 moves the pebble from n7 to the child n9 (in accordance with the deﬁnition of s0 from
Example 3.3). But then the pebble rests on n9, a -labeled descendant of n7, so the Strategy Hand Off Rule says that it is
strategy s7—and not strategy s0—that determines this particular move: s7 moves the pebble from n9 to the child n11. Since
n11 is a leaf, the game is then over with player ⊥ the winner by the fact that n11 is labeled by ⊥.
We have described almost all of the concepts needed to understand the notion of a pebble game with explicit strategies.
What is missing are two additional concepts that will be important later in the speciﬁc context of the LP Veriﬁcation Game.
These missing concepts are the forfeit move and the forfeit strategy.
A forfeit move is a new kind of move that we allow a player to make whenever it is his turn to move. When a player forfeits
(that is, when he makes a forfeit move), game play stops immediately and the forfeiting player loses.
Closely related to the concept of the forfeit move is the concept of forfeit strategy: a forfeit strategy is a special label that
we use to designate non-leaf nodes at which the player-to-move must immediately forfeit, no matter whether a strategy is
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currently controlling his moves.5 (When it is clear from context, we will generally omit the plural or singular of the words
“move” and “strategy” when we discuss forfeit moves or forfeit strategies, using the plural or singular of the word “forfeit”
to refer to either of these concepts.) Whenever forfeit moves and strategies are made part of the game, we will say that the
game is a game with forfeits.
Forfeits are the ﬁnal ingredients we need to complete the following deﬁnition: a pebble game with explicit strategies is a
pebble game with forfeits to whose rules we add the Strategy Hand Off Rule.
Example 3.10. Consider again the game board in Fig. 3. Deﬁne the strategy s0 as in Example 3.3 and the strategy s2 as in
Example 3.4. But in a change from before, let the strategy s7 at node n7 designate a forfeit strategy. With these respective
deﬁnitions of s0, s2, and s7, let us suppose that the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game board in Fig. 3 has
reached a point where the pebble rests on node n7. Since n7 is labeled both by  and by the forfeit strategy s7, player 
must then forfeit, and the game ends with player ⊥ the winner. Note that game play does not make it any further than node
n7, as this is the node at which player  forfeits. As such, this particular play of the game, which consists of the sequence
n0,n1,n2,n4,n7 of game tree nodes, ends not on a leaf but instead on the node at which the forfeit move was made.
Example 3.10 demonstrates the following fact: a play of the pebble game with explicit strategies ends on a leaf if and
only if no forfeit move was made6; furthermore, if a forfeit move is made during a play of this game, then this forfeit move
is the unique forfeit move made during the play and the node at which this forfeit move was made is the node that ends
the play. Taking note of this fact will help to make sense of the forthcoming deﬁnition of a play in the LP Veriﬁcation Game
(Deﬁnition 4.13).
In the next section, we will introduce the LP Veriﬁcation Game, a game whose essential underlying structure matches
that of the pebble game with explicit strategies.
4. The LP Veriﬁcation Game
The LP Veriﬁcation Game, whose name we often shorten to LP Veriﬁcation, is the game that we will use to deﬁne a
semantics for the theory of LP. It will be our task in this section to describe how this game provides us with a notion of
formula validity that makes formal sense of the reading “t is a winning strategy on B” for the formula t :B. Wewill later argue
that this notion of validity is correct, meaning that the formulas valid according to this notion are exactly those formulas
that are provable in the theory of LP.
The idea of the LP Veriﬁcation Game is rather simple. To determine the validity of a formula A, we construct a game board
treeTVS (A) for a pebble game with explicit strategies. Other than the formula A, the game boardT
V
S (A) depends on two
parameters: a parameter V that varies the winning conditions of the leaves and a parameter S that varies the labeling of
nodes by strategies. So once we ﬁx a particular pair (V , S), our two players  (“True”) and ⊥ (“False”) can play the pebble
game with explicit strategies on the game boardTVS (A). We then deﬁne a notion of truth and a notion of validity as follows.
To say that A is true in the parameter pair (V , S)means that there is a winning strategy for (“True”) in the pebble gamewith
explicit strategies on game boardTVS (A).
7 And to say that A is valid means that A is true in each admissible parameter pair
(V , S). So our notions of truth and validity do not depend on how well True happens to play a particular round of the game.
Instead, these notions depend on how well True can play the game in the best of circumstances; that is, the notions of truth
and validity depend on whether it is possible for True to guarantee himself a win in the game, which is just what it means
to say that there is a winning strategy for True.
So to begin, we need to say how the formula A and the parameter pair (V , S) determine the game boardTVS (A). To do
this, we ﬁrst deﬁne a ﬁnite tree that provides the underlying structure of the game board. This tree, writtenT(A), is built by
breaking down the formula A according to its inductive construction.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The construction tree of A, writtenT(A), is the labeled binary tree built as follows.
• The root ofT(A) is labeled A.
• If c is a binary logical connective, then each node inT(A) labeled B c C has exactly two children: a left child labeled B
and a right child labeled C. (Example: a node labeled B ⊃ C has a left child labeled B and a right child labeled C.)
• Each node inT(A) labeled ¬B has a unique child labeled B.
• Each node inT(A) labeled t :B has a unique child labeled B.
5 In case a node is labeled both by a (regular) strategy s and by the special symbol designating a forfeit strategy, then the forfeit strategy always takes
precedence: the player-to-movemust immediately forfeit, nomatter how good itmight otherwise have been for the player to follow the (regular) strategy s.
6 Recall that forfeits may only occur at non-leaves.
7 Our notion of truth uses the notion of strategy in a pebble game (with explicit strategies), as opposed to the notion of strategy at a node in a pebble game
(with explicit strategies). However, when we use the parameter S to label a node n inTVS (A) with a strategy, then, as before, we will label nwith a strategy
for a player at the node. See Remark 3.2 for the difference between these two kinds of strategy.
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Whenever it is convenient, we will identify occurrences of subformulas of A with nodes inT(A). As an example, to say
that “B is an occurrence of a subformula of A” is to refer to a node n inT(A) that is labeled by B.
This provides us with the ﬁnite treeT(A). But in order to have a game board for a pebble game with explicit strategies,
we still need to label each of the nodes of this tree by the name of one or the other of the players. We will accomplish this
labeling in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we will use the structure of A to label the non-leaves ofT(A). In the second stage,
we will use the input parameter V in addition to the structure of A to label the leaves (so varying V will vary the labeling of
the leaves). Let us now describe each of these labeling stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, we label the non-leaves ofT(A) using the structure of A itself. We do this as follows: label positive
non-conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) and negative conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) by, and label negative non-conjunctive
non-leaves inT(A) and positive conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) by ⊥. In this way, our labeling of the non-leaves ofT(A)
will be given by the notion of polarity (of a subformula occurrence).
Deﬁnition 4.2. A polarity is an assignment of either positive or negative to some object. Given a polarity, the opposite polarity
is the assignment consisting of the other polarity. We assign polarities to the nodes ofT(A) as follows.
• The root ofT(A) is positive.
• If a node inT(A) labeled B ⊃ C has already been assigned a polarity, then the left child B is assigned the opposite polarity
and the right child C is assigned the same polarity.
• If a node inT(A) labeled either B ∧ C or B ∨ C has already been assigned a polarity, then the left child B and the right
child C are each assigned this same polarity.
• If a node inT(A) labeled ¬B has already been assigned a polarity, then the child B is assigned the opposite polarity.
• If a node inT(A) labeled t :B has already been assigned a polarity, then the child B is assigned the same polarity.
Following our convention that identiﬁes occurrences of subformulas of A with nodes in T(A), we make the following
deﬁnition: to say that an occurrence of a subformula B of A has a certain polarity in A means that the node in T(A)
corresponding to this subformula occurrence has that very polarity.
We have said that we will label positive non-conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) and negative conjunctive non-leaves in
T(A) by , and we will label negative non-conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) and positive conjunctive non-leaves inT(A) by
⊥. This labeling is based on the following special kind of polarity called the position-polarity.
Deﬁnition 4.3. The position-polarity is a polarity that we assign to each node n inT(A) in the following way.
• If n is a non-conjunction, then the position-polarity assigned to n inT(A) is the same as the (regular) polarity that is
assigned to n inT(A) (according to Deﬁnition 4.2).
• If n is a conjunction, then the position-polarity of n inT(A) is the opposite of the (regular) polarity that is assigned to n
inT(A) (according to Deﬁnition 4.2).
Using the notion of position-polarity, our labeling of non-leaves n inT(A) can be described this way: n is labeled by
 if the node has positive position-polarity, and n is labeled by ⊥ if n has negative position-polarity. So True is to move at
the non-leaves with positive position-polarity, and False is to move at the non-leaves with negative position-polarity. Let us
establish some terminology reﬂecting this arrangement.
Deﬁnition 4.4. A -position (inT(A)) is a non-leaf inT(A) that has positive position-polarity, and a ⊥-position (inT(A))
is a non-leaf inT(A) that has negative position-polarity.
This completes the ﬁrst stage of labeling nodes ofT(A) by player names. To complete the second stage, we need to label
the leaves ofT(A) by the name of one or the other of the players. To do this, we will make use of the input parameter V ,
which is called a valuation set.
Deﬁnition 4.5. A valuation set is any set obtained as a union of {} with a possibly empty set of propositional letters.
Thinkof avaluation setV in the followingway.Anoccurrenceof anatomp inAhasapolarity according toDeﬁnition4.2. The
membership assertion of p in V also has a polarity: the positive membership assertion is “p ∈ V” and the negative membership
assertion is “p /∈ V”. The label of this particular occurrence of p, whether  (“True”) or ⊥ (“False”), says whether these two
polarities match. If it is true that these polarities match, then this occurrence of p is to be labeled by; if it is false that these
polarities match, so they in fact mismatch, then this occurrence of p is to be labeled by ⊥.
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Deﬁnition 4.6. Let V be a valuation set. To say that a leaf l inT(A) ismatching (under V) means that l is positive if and only
if the formula that labels l is a member of V . If a leaf inT(A) is not matching under V , then this leaf is said to bemismatching
(under V).
We will label leaves of T(A) according to this notion of matching: leaves that match are labeled  and leaves that
mismatch are labeled ⊥. This completes the labeling of the leaves ofT(A), which is the second and ﬁnal stage of labeling
the nodes ofT(A) by the names of one or the other of the players.
Taken together, our two labeling stages tell us how the formula A and the valuation set V induce a labeling of the nodes
ofT(A) by the names of one or the other of the players. We call this induced labeling the player labeling.
Deﬁnition 4.7. Let V be a valuation set. The player labeling ofT(A) (under V) is the function LV that maps each node ofT(A)
to the set {,⊥} according to the following.
• For each non-leaf n inT(A), we have
LV (n) :=
{ if n is a -position inT(A),
⊥ if n is a ⊥-position inT(A).
• For each leaf l inT(A), we have
LV (l) :=
{ if l is matching under V ,
⊥ if l is mismatching under V .
We deﬁneTV (A) to be the tree obtained fromT(A) by adding the label LV (n) to each node n inT(A).
The formula A and the valuation set V give rise to the ﬁnite treeTV (A)whose nodes are labeled by the name of one or the
other of the players. While this will sufﬁce as a game board for the pebble game with explicit strategies, it does not address
the issue of how a formula t :B can be assigned the reading “t is a winning strategy on B.” To address this issue, we introduce
an additional parameter S in the setup of the LP Veriﬁcation Game. This new parameter is called a strategy map.
Deﬁnition 4.8 (Strategy, strategy map). A strategy on B is a function mapping each -position inT(B) to a child of that
-position.8 A strategymap (on B) is a partial function thatmaps each term-formula pair (t,C) in the domain of S to a strategy
S(t,C) on C. Notation: S(t,C)↓ means that (t,C) is in the domain of S, and S(t,C)↑ means that (t,C) is not in the domain of S.
Given our ﬁnite treeT(A), wewill use a strategymap S on A to label the nodes ofT(A) by strategies for the players. To do
this, we will take an occurrence of a subformula t :B of A and examine whether (t,B) is in the domain of S. If S(t,B)↑, then we
will take this as tantamount to the speciﬁcation of a forfeit strategy, and so we will label the node inT(A) corresponding to
this occurrence of t :B by a forfeit strategy. If S(t,B)↓, then we will label the node inT(A) corresponding to this occurrence
of t :B by the strategy S(t,B) on B. In this way, the term t in the formula t :B does name a strategy on B (though it is not
necessarily a good strategy, an issue we will address shortly).
Deﬁnition 4.9. Let S be a strategymap on A. The strategy labeling ofT(A) (under S) is the partial function LS thatmaps nodes
ofT(A) to strategies. We deﬁne LS in three stages, with each stage to be completed before proceeding to the next stage.
1. For each node n labeled t :B such that S(t,B)↑, deﬁne LS(n) to be a forfeit strategy.
2. For each node n labeled t :B such that S(t,B)↓, deﬁne LS(n) to be the strategy S(t,B).
3. For each node n such that nwas not labeled in any of the previous stages, n is not in the domain of LS .
Notation: LS(n)↓ means that n is in the domain of LS , and LS(n)↑ means that n is not in the domain of LS . We deﬁneTS(A) to
be the tree obtained fromT(A) by adding the label LS(n) to each node n inT(A) that is in the domain of LS .
Combining the player labeling and the strategy labeling gives us a game boardTVS (A) for the pebble game with explicit
strategies.
Deﬁnition 4.10. Let V be a valuation set and let S be a strategy map. The treeTVS (A) is obtained fromT(A) using the player
labeling LV (Deﬁnition 4.7) and the strategy labeling LS (Deﬁnition 4.9) as follows.
• For each node n inT(A), add LV (n) to the label of n.
• For each node n inT(A) that is in the domain of LS , add LS(n) to the label of n.
8 So a strategy on B is a strategy in the pebble game (with explicit strategies). Note that this is not the same notion as the notion of strategy at the root of a
game board tree based onT(B). See Remark 3.2, which describes the difference between the notions of strategy in a pebble game (with explicit strategies)
and strategy at a node in a pebble game (with explicit strategies). In Deﬁnition 4.8, we are interested in the ﬁrst notion: the strategy in a pebble game (with
explicit strategies).
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Fig. 4. The construction treeT(A) from Example 4.11. Nodes names n0 through n9 have been added for convenience.
Fig. 5. The labeled treeTV(2,4)(A) from Example 4.11.
Example 4.11. Let 4¯ := {1, 2, 3, 4}, let pi be a propositional letter for each i ∈ 4¯, and let A denote the formula
t :
(
v :p1 ⊃ (u :(p2 ∧ p3) ⊃ p4)
)
.
Fig. 4 depicts the construction treeT(A); for convenience, we have named the nodes in this ﬁgure using the names n0
through n9. Observe that the subformula occurrence p4 is positive in A, while the subformula occurrences p1, p2, and p3 are
each negative in A. Thus for a valuation set V , the player labeling LV will assign to the node n4 inT(A) corresponding to p4
if p4 ∈ V (because the positive polarity of p4 matches the polarity of this positive membership assertion), and LV will assign
⊥ to this node if p4 /∈ V (because the positive polarity of p4 mismatches the polarity of this negative membership assertion).
Further, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the player labeling LV will assign  to the node inT(A) corresponding to pi if pi /∈ V (because
the negative polarity of pi matches the polarity of this negative membership assertion), and it will assign ⊥ to this node if
pi ∈ V (because the negative polarity of pi mismatches the polarity of this positivemembership assertion). So if we let V(2, 4)
be the valuation set {, p2, p4}, then we obtain the labeled treeTV(2,4)(A) depicted in Fig. 5. (Observe that n7 is labeled by 
because n7 is a negative conjunctive non-leaf inT(A), fromwhich it follows by Deﬁnitions 4.3 and 4.4 that n7 is a-position
inT(A).) Let us now see how a strategy map adds strategy labels to this tree. Let B denote the formula
v :p1 ⊃ (u :(p2 ∧ p3) ⊃ p4).
We deﬁne the strategy st on B using the node names from Fig. 5 in the following way:
• at node n1, choose the child n3;
• at node n3, choose the child n5;
• at node n7, choose the child n9.
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Fig. 6. The labeled treeTV(2,4)S (A) from Example 4.11. An asterisk (“*”) denotes a forfeit strategy.
Now deﬁne the strategy su on p2 ∧ p3 to be the empty strategy; this is all right: there are no -positions inT(p2 ∧ p3).
Finally, let S be a strategy map such that S(t,B) = st , S(v, p1)↑, and S(u, p2 ∧ p3) = su. Using the player labeling LV(2,4) and
the strategy labeling LS , we obtain the labeled treeT
V(2,4)
S (A) depicted in Fig. 6. The players  (“True”) and ⊥ (“False”) may
now play the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game boardTV(2,4)S (A). In this game, the pebble begins at the root
n0. Since n0 is labeled by  and by st , the Strategy Hand Off Rule applies: control of True’s moves at descendants of n0 is
immediately relinquished to s0. Since n0 is not a descendant of itself (by our convention on descendants), True has to move
at n0, though his move is trivialized by the fact that n0 has only one child. So True moves the pebble from n0 to the child n1.
But n1 is a -labeled descendant of n0, so the Strategy Hand Off Rule has st move: st moves the pebble from n1 to the child
n3 (in accordance with the deﬁnition of st). Since n3 is a -labeled descendant of n0, the Strategy Hand Off Rule again has st
move: st moves the pebble from n3 to the child n5 (also in accordance with the deﬁnition of st). Since n5 is labeled by ⊥ and
by su, the Strategy Hand Off Rule applies yet again: control of False’s moves at descendants of n5 is immediately relinquished
to su. Since n5 is not a descendant of itself, False has to move at n5, though his move is likewise trivialized. So False moves
the pebble from n5 to the child n7. But n7 is a -labeled descendant of n0, so the Strategy Hand Off Rule then has st move
once again: st moves the pebble from n7 to the child n9 (in accordance with the deﬁnition of st). Since n9 is a leaf, the game
is over with player  the winner by the fact that n9 is labeled by . This concludes Example 4.11.
Example 4.11 shows how a play of LP Veriﬁcation may be identiﬁed with a play of a pebble game with explicit strategies.
This identiﬁcation uses a strategy map S to assign a strategy S(t,B) on the formula B, thereby justifying a reading of t :B as “t
is a strategy on B.” While this moves us closer to achieving our proposed reading of t :B as “t is a winning strategy on B,” we
are missing a requirement that the strategy map S assign a winning strategy S(t,B) on B in case S(t,B)↓. In order to address
this missing requirement, let us introduce some additional terminology.
Deﬁnition 4.12. A partial play of A is a nonempty sequence {ni}ki=0 of nodes inT(A) such that n0 is the root ofT(A) and
ni+1 is a child inT(A) of ni for each non-negative integer i < k. A partial play {ni}ki=0 of A is said to end on the node nk at the
end of the sequence {ni}ki=0 that makes up the partial play.
A partial play of A is just a path in the treeT(A) that begins at the root. In the pebble game with explicit strategies, it is
the Strategy Hand Off Rule that determines whether a given partial play of A is legal according to the rules of the game. In
particular, for a partial play of A to be legal it must satisfy the following: if a node n occurring in the partial play is labeled
by a player P and by a non-forfeit strategy LS(n) and LS(n) does not relinquish control to another strategy before reaching a
non-leaf P-labeled descendant n′ of n occurring somewhere before the end of the partial play, then the node following n′ in
the partial play must be the node speciﬁed by the strategy LS(n). So we see that as long as each such strategy-coupled pair
(n,n′) occurring in a partial play of A satisﬁes the property that the node following n′ in the partial play is chosen by the
strategy LS(n), then the partial play is in accord with the Strategy Hand Off Rule, and so the partial play is legal according to
the rules of the pebble game with explicit strategies. This leads us to the following deﬁnition of what constitutes a (full and
legal) play of the game.
Deﬁnition 4.13. Let S be a strategy map.
• To say that (na,nb) is a strategy-coupled pair (under S) occurring in a partial play {ni}ki=0 of Ameans we have that 0 ≤ a ≤
b ≤ k and that each of the following properties is satisﬁed.
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− The strategy labeling LS labels node na by a non-forfeit strategy: LS(na)↓ and LS(na) is not a forfeit.
− nb is a descendant of na; that is, a < b.9
− nb is not the last member of the sequence; that is, b < k.10
− The player who moves at na is the same player that moves at nb; that is, na and nb have the same position-polarity in
T(A). (Position-polarity is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.3.)
− In the pebble game with explicit strategies, the strategy LS(na) does not relinquish control to a strategy labeling an
intermediate node because no intermediate node of the same position-polarity is labeled by a strategy; that is, if
a < c < b and node nc has the same position-polarity inT(A) as does na, then LS(nc)↑.11
• To say that a node n inT(A) is forfeited (under S)means that n is labeled by t :B and S(t,B)↑.
• An S-play of A is a partial play {ni}ki=0 of A satisfying each of the following properties.
− If a node nj in the sequence is forfeited under S, then this node is last node in the sequence (that is, j = k).12
− If no node in the sequence is forfeited under S, then the node nk at the end of the sequence is a leaf inT(A).
− The sequence is in accord with the strategy map S, by which we mean the following: for each strategy-coupled pair
(na,nb) occurring in {ni}ki=0, if we let s denote the strategy LS(na) that labels na, then nb+1 = s(nb).
When it ought not cause confusion, we may refer to an S-play as a play.
• To say that an S-play {ni}ki=0 is forfeitedmeans that the last node nk in the sequence {ni}ki=0 is forfeited under S.
Given the above deﬁnition, we may now specify what it means for a strategy to be winning. Intuitively, to say that a
strategy iswinning means that a player who plays according to the strategy is guaranteed a win, no matter the moves made
by the opponent. So in the speciﬁc situation of the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game boardTVS (A), where
a strategy on A is a strategy for True (Deﬁnition 4.8), this amounts to the following: for each play in which True made his
moves by following a winning strategy up to the point at which the Strategy Hand Off Rule passed control of True’s moves
to some other strategy (should such a point exist), the play in question ends either on a non-leaf at which False forfeits or
else on a leaf that is matching in A (meaning that the leaf is labeled by ). To formalize this, let us ﬁrst give a name to those
nodes at which a player has no control over his moves (by the fact that the Strategy Hand Off Rule has passed control of his
moves to some strategy).
Deﬁnition 4.14. To say that a node n inT(A) is determinedmeans that n has an ancestor n′ inT(A) such that n′ is labeled by
a formula of the form t :B and n′ has the same position-polarity as does n inT(A). Important point: we adopt the convention
that a node is not an ancestor of itself. To say that a node inT(A) is undeterminedmeans that the node is not determined.
Our intention is that a non-leaf is determined when a move at that non-leaf is controlled by a labeling strategy as per
the Strategy Hand Off Rule. Hence the determined nodes ought to be just those nodes that have a same position-polarity
ancestor labeled by a strategy. According to our strategy labeling (Deﬁnition 4.9), a node will have a same position-polarity
ancestor labeled by a strategy if and only if the node has a same position-polarity ancestor labeled by a formula of the form
t :B. This is the reason why we deﬁned determined nodes as above.
Since a player cannot control his moves at determined nodes, any strategy that he uses to try and win will only affect his
moves at undeterminednodes. So the inﬂuence of a given strategy (for True) is limited to the choices itmakes at undetermined
nodes (at which True is to move). And a strategy iswinning exactly when True is guaranteed a win whenever he follows this
strategy. We are lead to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.15 (Winning strategy). Let V be a valuation and S be a strategy map.
• To say that a partial play {ni}ki=0 of A follows a strategy A∗ on A means that for each non-negative integer i < k such that
ni is an undetermined -position inT(A), we have that ni+1 = A∗(ni).
• To say that a strategyA∗ on A iswinning under (V , S)means that each S-play ofA that followsA∗ ends either on a⊥-position
or else on a leaf that is matching under V .
Weobserve that aplayofA that endsona⊥-position inT(A) is a play ofA that endedwith a forfeit by False (Deﬁnitions 4.7,
4.9, and 4.13), and True is to win such a play. This is the reason for the case distinction in Deﬁnition 4.15’s consideration of
plays that follow a winning strategy.
The reader has perhaps noticed that a strategy on a formula A (Deﬁnition 4.8) is really a strategy for True. After all, a
strategy on A speciﬁes moves at -positions ofT(A) and it is True that is to move at these positions (Deﬁnition 4.7). So in
the interest of having a notion of strategy for False, we make the following deﬁnition.
9 Recall our convention that a node is not a descendant of itself.
10 Note that this requirement implies that nb is a non-leaf.
11 Note that Ls(nc)↑ implies that nc is labeled neither by a forfeit strategy nor by a (regular) strategy (see Deﬁnition 4.9).
12 Note that this implies that there is at most one node in the sequence that is forfeited under S.
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Deﬁnition 4.16. A counter-strategy on B is a function mapping each ⊥-position inT(B) to a child of that ⊥-position.
There is a natural duality between strategies and counter-strategies. To describe this duality, we introduce the following
notation.
Notation 4.17. If s is a strategy or counter-strategy on A and B is an occurrence of a subformula of A, then s B denotes the
function obtained by restricting the domain of s to the nodes of the subtreeT(B) ofT(A).
The duality between strategies and counter-strategies is then characterized by the following lemma, whose proof is
straightforward.
Lemma 4.18. Let B be an occurrence of a subformula of A.
• Suppose A∗ is a strategy on A.
− If B is positive in A, then A∗ B is a strategy on B.
− If B is negative in A, then A∗ B is a counter-strategy on B.
• Suppose A∗ is a counter-strategy on A.
− If B is positive in A, then A∗ B is a counter-strategy on B.
− If B is negative in A, then A∗ B is a strategy on B.
Following the lead in Deﬁnition 4.15 (deﬁnition of a winning strategy), we deﬁne what it means for a counter-strategy to
be winning (for False).
Deﬁnition 4.19. Let V be a valuation set and S be a strategy map.
• To say that a partial play {ni}ki=0 of A follows a counter-strategy A∗ on A means that for each non-negative integer i < k
such that ni is an undetermined ⊥-position inT(A), we have that ni+1 = A∗(ni).
• To say that a counter-strategy A∗ on A iswinning under (V , S) means that each S-play of A that follows A∗ ends either on a
-position or else on a leaf that is mismatching under V .
We observe that a play of A that ends on a-position inT(A) is a play of A that endswith a forfeit by True (Deﬁnitions 4.7,
4.9, and 4.13), and False is to win such a play. This is the reason for the case distinction in Deﬁnition 4.19’s consideration of
plays that follow a winning counter-strategy.
To gain the reading “t is a winning strategy on B” for the formula t :B under a valuation set V , wewill restrict our attention
to those strategy maps that are good for our valuation set, in the sense of the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.20. Let V be a valuation set. To say that a strategy map S is good for V means that whenever S(t,B)↓, we have
that S(t,B) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B.
All that remains is for us to restrict attention to those strategy maps that assign strategies in a way that respects the
intended meaning of the term-forming functions in the language of LP.
Deﬁnition 4.21. To say that a strategy map S is proper means that S satisﬁes each of the following conditions.
1. Product. If S(u,B ⊃ C)↓ and S(v,B)↓, then both
(a) S(u · v,C) = S(u,B ⊃ C) C, and
(b) S(u,D ⊃ C)↓ and S(v,D)↓ implies S(u,D ⊃ C) C = S(u,B ⊃ C) C.13
2. Proof Checker. S(t,B)↓ implies S(!t, t :B)↓.
3. Sum.
(a) S(u,B)↓ implies S(u + v,B) = S(u,B).
(b) S(u,B)↑ and S(v,B)↓ implies S(u + v,B) = S(v,B).
4. Constant Necessitation. If c is a constant and B is an axiom of LP, then S(c,B)↓.
13 This condition is included to ensure that S(u · v,C) is well-deﬁned. The condition is otherwise unused.
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A proper strategy map S provides an interpretation for the term-forming functions in the language of LP, in the sense
that a strategy S(t,B) assigned to a term t will depend on the strategies S(u,C) assigned to the terms u that make up t. Proper
strategy maps are the ﬁnal ingredient we need in order to deﬁne a notion of model for use in our semantics for the language
of LP.
Deﬁnition 4.22. Amodel is a pair (V , S) consisting of a valuation set V and a proper strategy map S that is good for V .
A model (V , S) provides the parameters we need in order to determine whether a formula is true. But before we give the
deﬁnition of truth, let us ﬁrst prove that the concept of model is not an empty concept.
Theorem 4.23. For each valuation set V , there is a proper strategy map that is good for V .
Proof. In the context of this proof, the conjunction of a ﬁnite set of formulas is the conjunction whose conjuncts consist of
the formulas in that set. To say that a set of formulas is consistent means that for no conjunction C of a ﬁnite subset do we
have that C ⊃ ⊥ is provable in LP. To say that a set of formulas is inconsistent means that the set is not consistent. To say that
a set of formulas ismaximal consistent means that the set is consistent and the addition of any formula not already in the set
would make the resulting set inconsistent. Using a Lindenbaum argument, any consistent set of formulas may be extended
to a maximal consistent set. Letting V be a ﬁxed valuation set, we deﬁne V ′ := V ∪ {¬p : p /∈ V}, where p is a metavariable
ranging over atoms (propositional letters,, and⊥). The set V ′ is consistent and somay be extended to amaximal consistent
set T .
If c is a binary logical connective, then we letB(B c C) abbreviate the biconditional statement “B ∈ T if and only if B is a
positive subformula occurrence of B c C.” Then for each non-atomic formula A, we deﬁne functions W and W⊥ that map
the root r ofT(A) to a child of r according to the following.
• For a binary logical connective c, we deﬁne
W(B c C) :=
{
B ifB(B c C),
C otherwise;
W⊥(B c C) :=
{
C ifB(B c C),
B otherwise.
• W(¬B) := B andW⊥(¬B) := B.
• W(t :B) := B andW⊥(t :B) := B.
For each formula A, we deﬁne the strategy A∗ on A and the counter-strategy A∗ on A according to the following.
• The domain of A∗ is the set of -positions inT(A), and for each -position B inT(A), we deﬁne
A∗(B) :=
{
W(B) if this occurrence of B is positive in A,
W⊥(B) if this occurrence of B is negative in A.
• The domain of A∗ is the set of ⊥-positions inT(A), and for each ⊥-position B inT(A), we deﬁne
A∗(B) :=
{
W(B) if this occurrence of B is negative in A,
W⊥(B) if this occurrence of B is positive in A.
We now state and prove three properties of the functions A∗ and A∗.
• For each atom p, we have that p∗ is the empty strategy on p and that p* is the empty counter-strategy on p.14
The domain of p∗ is the set of -positions inT(p). But a -position is a non-leaf (Deﬁnition 4.4) and the one and only
node inT(p), the root, is a leaf. It follows that the domain of p∗ is the empty set, which implies that p∗ is the empty
function. But this is what it means to say that p∗ is the empty strategy.
The argument that the function p* is the empty counter-strategy is similar.
• If B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A, then A∗ B = B∗ and A∗ B = B∗.
We argue that A∗ B = B∗. First, the domain of A∗ B consists of the-positions in A that are also inT(B) (Notation 4.17).
But a -position of A that is inT(B) is itself a -position in B because B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A.
Similarly, a -position inT(B) is itself a -position inT(A) because B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A. It
follows that the domains of A∗ B and B∗ are identical. Second, for each -position C inT(B), we have by the deﬁnition
of B∗ that
B∗(C) =
{
W(C) if this occurrence of C is positive in B,
W⊥(C) if this occurrence of C is negative in B.
14 The empty strategy and the empty counter-strategy are names for the empty function (the function with empty domain).
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But if C is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B, then C is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A because B
is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A. Similarly, if C is an occurrence of a negative subformula of B, then C is an
occurrence of a negative subformula of A because B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A. So it follows that
B∗(C) =
{
W(C) if this occurrence of C is positive in A,
W⊥(C) if this occurrence of C is negative in A.
But then we have that B∗(C) = A∗(C) = (A∗ B)(C), where the rightmost equality follows by the fact that C is inT(B).
Since C was an arbitrary -position inT(B), we have shown that A∗ B = B∗. The argument that A∗ B = B∗ is shown
similarly.
• If B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of A, then A∗ B = B∗ and A∗ B = B∗.
We argue that A∗ B = B∗. First, the domain of A∗ B consists of the-positions in A that are also inT(B) (Notation 4.17).
But a -position of A that is inT(B) is itself a ⊥-position in B because B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of A.
Similarly, a ⊥-position in B is itself a -position in A because B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of A. It follows
that the domains of A∗ B and B∗ are identical. Second, for each⊥-position C inT(B), we have by the deﬁnition of B∗ that
B∗(C) =
{
W(C) if this occurrence of C is negative in B,
W⊥(C) if this occurrence of C is positive in B.
But if C is an occurrence of negative subformula of B, then C is an occurrence of a positive subformula of A because B is
an occurrence of a negative subformula of A. Similarly, if C is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B, then C is an
occurrence of a negative subformula of A because B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of A. So it follows that
B∗(C) =
{
W(C) if this occurrence of C is positive in A,
W⊥(C) if this occurrence of C is negative in A.
But then we have that B∗(C) = A∗(C) = (A∗ B)(C), where the rightmost equality follows by the fact that C is inT(B).
Since C was an arbitrary ⊥-position inT(B), we have shown that A∗ B = B∗. The argument that A∗ B = B∗ is shown
similarly.
We will make frequent use of the above properties in the remainder of this proof.
We now deﬁne a strategy map S. The domain of S consists of all term-formula pairs (t,A) such that t :A ∈ T , and for each
pair (t,A) in the domain of S, we set S(t,A) := A∗. We now argue that S is proper.
1. Product. Suppose that S(u,B ⊃ C)↓ and S(v,B)↓.
(a) We show that S(u · v,C) = S(u,B ⊃ C) C.
By the deﬁnition of S, we have that u :(B ⊃ C) ∈ T and that v :B ∈ T . It follows that (u · v) :C ∈ T by LP1 and the
maximal consistency of T . Applying the deﬁnition of S, we have that S(u · v,C)↓ and that S(u · v,C) = C∗. Since C is
an occurrence of a positive subformula of B ⊃ C, we have that C∗ = (B ⊃ C)∗ C. But (B ⊃ C)∗ C = S(u,B ⊃ C) C by
the deﬁnition of S, and hence S(u · v,C) = S(u,B ⊃ C) C.
(b) We show that S(u,D ⊃ C)↓ and S(v,D)↓ together imply that S(u,D ⊃ C) C = S(u,B ⊃ C) C.
By the deﬁnition of S, we have that S(u,D ⊃ C) C = (D ⊃ C)∗ C and S(u,B ⊃ C) C = (B ⊃ C)∗ C. Since C is an
occurrence of a positive subformula of B ⊃ C and of D ⊃ C, we have C∗ = (B ⊃ C)∗ C and C∗ = (D ⊃ C)∗ C.
2. Proof Checker. Suppose that S(u,B)↓. We show that S(!u,u :B)↓.
By the deﬁnition of S, we have u :B ∈ T and thus that !u :(u :B) ∈ T by LP2 and themaximal consistency of T . It follows that
S(!u,u :B)↓ by the deﬁnition of S.
3. Sum.
(a) We show that S(u,B)↓ implies S(u + v,B) = S(u,B).
Suppose S(u,B)↓. By the deﬁnition of S, we thenhave that u :B ∈ T and thus that (u + v) :B ∈ T by LP3 and themaximal
consistency of T . It then follows from the deﬁnition of S both that S(u + v,B) = B∗ and that S(u,B) = B∗.
(b) We show that S(u,B)↑ and S(v,B)↓ implies S(u + v,B) = S(v,B).
This follows by an argument similar to the previous case.
4. Constant Necessitation.We show that for each constant c and each axiom B of LP, we have that S(c,B)↓.
If c is a constant and B is an axiom of LP, it follows by the rule of Constant Necessitation and the maximal consistency of
T that c :B ∈ T . Applying the deﬁnition of S, we then have that S(c,B)↓.
So S is indeed a proper strategy map.
What remains is to show that S is good for V . To prove this, we ﬁrst assume what we call theWS Property: A ∈ T implies
A∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A, and A /∈ T implies A∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on A. Wewill prove
the WS Property in a moment, but let us ﬁrst show that the WS Property implies that S is good for V . That is, we prove that
the WS Property and S(t,A)↓ together imply that S(t,A) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A.
So suppose that theWSProperty holds and that S(t,A)↓. By our deﬁnition of S, S(t,A)↓ implies that S(t,A) = A∗ and t :A ∈ T .
But t :A ∈ T implies that A ∈ T by LP4 and the maximal consistency of T . Applying the WS Property, A ∈ T implies that A∗ is
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a winning strategy under (V , S) on A. But then A∗ = S(t,A) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A. We have therefore shown
that theWS Property and S(t,A)↓ together imply that S(t,A) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A. But this is what it means
to say that the WS Property implies that S is good for V .
So we complete the proof by proving theWS Property: A ∈ T implies A∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A, and A /∈ T
implies A∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on A. We prove the WS Property by induction on the construction of
formulas.
• Base case: the formula is an atom p.
T was constructed as a maximal consistent extension of V ′ := V ∪ {¬p : p /∈ V}. As such, we have that p ∈ T if and only if
p ∈ V . Thus p ∈ T implies p ∈ V , which implies that the empty strategy p∗ is winning under (V , S) on p. Similarly, p /∈ T
implies p /∈ V , which implies that the empty counter-strategy p* is winning under (V , S) on p.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ⊃ C.
Assume that (B ⊃ C) ∈ T . It follows from themaximal consistency of T that B /∈ T or C ∈ T . We consider each case in turn.
− Case: B /∈ T .
Since B /∈ T and B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of B ⊃ C, we have thatB(B ⊃ C) is true and thus that (B ⊃
C)∗(B ⊃ C) = W(B ⊃ C) = B. Further, (B ⊃ C)∗ B = B∗ by the fact that B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of
B ⊃ C. But B /∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B. So we see
that (B ⊃ C)∗ is the following strategy for player  in the pebble game with explicit strategies onTVS (B ⊃ C): at the
-position B ⊃ C, choose the⊥-position B; at the⊥-position B, play thewinning counter-strategy B∗; at the-position
C, play the strategy C∗. Conclusion: (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
− Case: B ∈ T and C ∈ T .
Since B ∈ T and B is an occurrence of a negative subformula of B ⊃ C, it follows that B(B ⊃ C) is false and thus
that (B ⊃ C)∗(B ⊃ C) = W(B ⊃ C) = C. Further, (B ⊃ C)∗ C = C∗ by the fact that C is an occurrence of a positive
subformula of B ⊃ C. But C ∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that C∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on C. So
we see that (B ⊃ C)∗ is the following strategy for player ⊥ in the pebble game with explicit strategies onTVS (B ⊃ C):
at the -position B ⊃ C, choose the -position C; at the ⊥-position B, play the counter-strategy B∗; at the -position
C, play the winning strategy C∗. Conclusion: (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
Now assume that (B ⊃ C) /∈ T . It follows from the maximal consistency of T that B ∈ T and C /∈ T . Since B and C are
occurrences of negative andpositive subformulas ofB ⊃ C (respectively),wehave that (B ⊃ C)* B = B∗ and (B ⊃ C)* C =
C*. But B ∈ T and C /∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B and that C* is
a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on C. So we see that (B ⊃ C)* is the following strategy for player ⊥ in the pebble
game with explicit strategies onTVS (B ⊃ C): at the ⊥-position B, play the winning strategy B∗; at the -position C, play
the winning counter-strategy C*. Conclusion: (B ⊃ C)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ∧ C.
Assume that (B ∧ C) ∈ T . It follows by the maximal consistency of T that B ∈ T and C ∈ T . Since each of B and C is an
occurrence of a positive subformula of B ∧ C, we have that (B ∧ C)∗ B = B∗ and that (B ∧ C)∗ C = C∗. But B ∈ T and
C ∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B and C∗ is a winning strategy
under (V , S) on C. So we see that (B ∧ C)∗ is the following strategy for player in the pebble gamewith explicit strategies
on TVS (B ∧ C): at the -position B, play the winning strategy B∗; at the -position C, play the winning strategy C∗.
Conclusion: (B ∧ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ∧ C.
Now assume that (B ∧ C) /∈ T . It follows by the maximal consistency of T that B /∈ T or C /∈ T . We consider each case in
turn.
− Case: B /∈ T .
Since B /∈ T and B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B ∧ C, we have that B(B ∧ C) is false and thus that
(B ∧ C)*(B ∧ C) = W⊥(B ∧ C) = B. Since B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B ∧ C, we have that (B ∧ C)* B =
B∗. But B /∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B. So we see
that (B ∧ C)* is the following strategy for player ⊥ in the pebble game with explicit strategies onTVS (B ∧ C): at the
⊥-position B ∧ C, choose the-position B; at the-position B, play thewinning counter-strategy B∗; at the-position
B, play the counter-strategy C*. Conclusion: (B ∧ C)* is a winning-counter strategy under (V , S) on B ∧ C.
− Case: B ∈ T and C /∈ T .
Since B ∈ T and B is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B ∧ C, we have that B(B ∧ C) is true and thus that
(B ∧ C)*(B ∧ C) = W⊥(B ∧ C) = C. SinceC is an occurrence of a positive subformula of B ∧ C, we have that (B ∧ C)* C =
C*. But C /∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that C* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on C. So we see
that (B ∧ C)* is the following strategy for player ⊥ in the pebble game with explicit strategies onTVS (B ∧ C): at the
⊥-position B ∧ C, choose the -position C; at the -position B, play the counter-strategy B∗; at the -position C, play
the winning counter-strategy C*. Conclusion: (B ∧ C)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B ∧ C.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ∨ C.
As in the argument for the case B ⊃ C, though with the necessary changes made in the appropriate places.
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• Inductive case: the formula is of the form ¬B.
Assume that ¬B ∈ T . It follows from the maximal consistency of T that B /∈ T . Since B is an occurrence of a negative
subformula of¬B, we have that (¬B)∗ B = B∗. But B /∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is awinning counter-
strategy under (V , S) on B. Since (¬B)∗(¬B) = W(¬B) = B, we see that (¬B)∗ is the following strategy for player  in the
pebble gamewith explicit strategies onTVS (¬B): at the-position¬B, choose the⊥-position B; at the⊥-position B, play
the winning counter-strategy B∗. Conclusion: (¬B)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on ¬B.
Now assume that ¬B /∈ T . It follows from the maximal consistency of T that B ∈ T . Since B is an occurrence of a negative
subformula of¬B, we have that (¬B)* B = B∗. But B ∈ T , so the induction hypothesis implies that B∗ is a winning strategy
under (V , S) on B. So we see that (¬B)∗ is the following strategy for player⊥ in the pebble gamewith explicit strategies on
TVS (¬B): at the ⊥-position B, play the winning strategy B∗. Conclusion: (¬B)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S)
on ¬B.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form t :B.
Assume that t :B ∈ T . By our deﬁnition of S, we then have that S(t,B)↓ and S(t,B) = B∗. Further, S(t,B)↓ implies that the
root ofTVS (t :B) is labeled by the strategy S(t,B) = B∗. But t :B ∈ T implies B ∈ T by LP4 and the maximal consistency of
T , from which it follows by the induction hypothesis that B∗ = S(t,B) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B. In addition,
we observe that (t :B)∗(t :B) = W(t :B) = B. But then the strategy (t :B)∗ for player  in the pebble game with explicit
strategies onTVS (t :B) has the following effect: at the -position t :B, the -position B is chosen; however, since the
-position t :B is labeled by the winning strategy S(t,B) = B∗ and the -position B is a descendant of the -position t :B,
thewinning strategy B∗ takes control of player’s moves beginning at the-position B. It follows that (t :B)∗ is a winning
strategy under (V , S) on t :B.
Nowassumethat t :B /∈ T . By thedeﬁnitionof S,we thenhave that S(t,B)↑,which implies that the rootofTVS (t :B) is labeled
by a forfeit strategy. Player therefore forfeits on his ﬁrstmove in the pebble gamewith explicit strategies onTVS (t :B). It
follows that any counter-strategy on t :B is winning under (V , S) on t :B. Hence (t :B)* is a winning counter-strategy under
(V , S) on t :B.
So the WS Property indeed holds, and the proof of this theorem is therefore complete. 
So we see that our concept of model is not an empty concept. We now use this concept to deﬁne our game semantics for
the language of LP.
Deﬁnition 4.24 (Truth, validity). Let (V , S) be a model. To say that A is true in (V , S), written V , S |= A, means that there is a
winning strategy under (V , S) on the formula A. To say that A is valid, written |= A, means that A is true in every model.
Saying that A is true in a model (V , S) means just that there is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A, which is equivalent to
saying that there is a winning strategy for  (“True”) in the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game boardTVS (A).
Identifying the LP Veriﬁcation Game on the formula Awithmodel (V , S)with the latter pebble gamewith explicit strategies,
we see how it is that LP Veriﬁcation provides a notion of truth for LP formulas.
Deﬁnition 4.25. Let (V , S) be a model. The LP Veriﬁcation Game on A under (V , S) is the pebble game with explicit strategies
on the game boardTVS (A) with players  (“True”) and ⊥ (“False”).
Note that in the particular case of the formula t :B, we have that t :B is true in amodel (V , S) if and only if S(t,B) is awinning
strategy under (V , S) on B. Thinking of the term t as naming the strategy S(t,B) on B, we are led to our reading “t is a winning
strategy on B” for the formula t :B.
5. Correctness
While we have deﬁned a notion of truth for formulas in the language of LP (Deﬁnition 4.24), we still need to check that
this notion behaves appropriately; that is, we will prove that our notion of truth satisﬁes a compositionality property: the
truth value of a formula A in a model can be determined using the truth values of the formulas that make up A along with
certain properties of the model.
As our ﬁrst step toward showing that our notion of truth iswell-behaved,we prove that there is always exactly onewinner
in the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game boardTVS (A) with model (V , S).
Lemma 5.1 (Determinacy Lemma). For each model (V , S) and each formula A, there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on
A or else a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on A.
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Proof. This lemma can be viewed as a special case of the Gale-Stewart Theorem [20,5]; nonetheless, it will be instructive for
us to prove the result directly for LPVeriﬁcation. Proceeding, let (V , S) be amodel.We show by induction on the construction
of the formula A that there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on A or else a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on A.
• Base case: the formula is an atom p.
The empty strategy is winning under (V , S) on p if and only if p ∈ V , and the empty counter-strategy is winning under
(V , S) on p if and only if p /∈ V . Since we have either that p ∈ V or that p /∈ V , it follows that there is either a winning
strategy under (V , S) on p or else a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on p.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ⊃ C.
By the induction hypothesis, there is a either a winning strategy under (V , S) on B or a winning counter-strategy under
(V , S) on B; likewise, there is a either a winning strategy under (V , S) on C or a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on
C. We consider three cases.
− B∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B.
First, let us ﬁx an arbitrary strategy C∗ on C.We then deﬁne the strategy (B ⊃ C)∗ on B ⊃ C as follows: at the-position
B ⊃ C, choose the ⊥-position B; at the ⊥-position B, play the winning counter-strategy B∗; at the -position C, play
the strategy C∗. It is not hard to see that (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
− C∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on C.
First, let us ﬁx an arbitrary counter-strategy B∗ on B. We then deﬁne the strategy (B ⊃ C)∗ on B ⊃ C as follows: at the
-position B ⊃ C, choose the-position C; at the⊥-position B, play the counter-strategy B∗; at the-position C, play
the winning strategy C∗. It is not hard to see that (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
− B∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B and C* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on C.
Deﬁne the counter-strategy (B ⊃ C)* on B ⊃ C as follows: at the ⊥-position B, play the winning strategy B∗; at the
-position C, play the winning counter-strategy C*. It is not hard to see that (B ⊃ C)∗ is a winning counter-strategy
under (V , S) on B ⊃ C.
Conclusion: there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ⊃ C or else a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on
B ⊃ C.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ∧ C.
By the induction hypothesis, there is a either a winning strategy under (V , S) on B or a winning counter-strategy under
(V , S) on B; likewise, there is a either a winning strategy under (V , S) on C or a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on
C. We consider three cases.
− B∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B and C∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on C.
Deﬁne the strategy (B ∧ C)∗ on B ∧ C as follows: at the -position B, play the winning strategy B∗; at the -position
C, play the winning strategy C∗. It is not hard to see that (B ∧ C)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ∧ C.
− B∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B.
First, let us ﬁx an arbitrary counter-strategy C* on C. We then deﬁne the counter-strategy (B ∧ C)* on B ∧ C as follows:
at the ⊥-position B ∧ C, choose the -position B; at the -position B, play the winning counter-strategy B∗; at the
-position C, play the counter-strategy C*. It is not hard to see that (B ∧ C)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S)
on B ∧ C.
− C* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on C.
First, let us ﬁx an arbitrary counter-strategy B∗ on B. We then deﬁne the counter-strategy (B ∧ C)* on B ∧ C as follows:
at the ⊥-position B ∧ C, choose the -position C; at the -position B, play the counter-strategy B∗; at the -position
C, play the winning counter-strategy C*. It is not hard to see that (B ∧ C)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S)
on B ∧ C.
Conclusion: there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on B ∧ C or else a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on
B ∧ C.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form B ∨ C.
As in the argument for the case B ⊃ C, though with the necessary changes made in the appropriate places.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form ¬B.
By the induction hypothesis, there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on B or else a winning counter-strategy under
(V , S) on B. Let us consider each case in turn.
Suppose B∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on B. Deﬁne the counter-strategy (¬B)* on ¬B as follows: at the ⊥-position
B, play the winning strategy B∗. It is not hard to see that (¬B)* is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on ¬B.
Now suppose B∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on B. Deﬁne the strategy (¬B)∗ on ¬B as follows: at the -
position ¬B, choose the ⊥-position B; at the ⊥-position B, play the winning counter-strategy B∗. It is not hard to see that
(¬B)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on ¬B.
Conclusion: there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on ¬B or else a winning-counter strategy under (V , S) on ¬B.
• Inductive case: the formula is of the form t :B.
We have either that S(t,B)↓ or else that S(t,B)↑. Let us examine each case in turn.
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Suppose S(t,B)↓. Since (V , S) is amodel, we have that S is good for V , which implies that S(t,B) is a winning strategy under
(V , S) on B. Deﬁne the strategy (t :B)∗ on t :B as follows: at the -position t :B, choose the -position B; at the -position
B, play the winning strategy S(t,B). It is not hard to see that (t :B)∗ is a winning strategy under (V , S) on t :B.15
Now suppose S(t,B)↑. Let (t :B)* be an arbitrary counter-strategy on t :B. It is not hard to see that (t :B)* is a winning
counter-strategy under (V , S) on t :B. After all, the root ofTVS (t :B) is to be labeled by a forfeit strategy by the fact that
S(t,B)↑ (Deﬁnitions 4.9 and 4.10).
Conclusion: there is either a winning strategy under (V , S) on t :B or else a winning-counter strategy under (V , S) on t :B.

The Determinacy Lemma (Lemma 5.1) suggests the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let (V , S) be a model. To say that A is false in (V , S), written V , S |= A, means that there is a winning counter-
strategy under (V , S) on the formula A.
Given this deﬁnition, we may restate the Determinacy Lemma (Lemma 5.1) in the following way: each formula is either
true or false in a model, but never both. In addition, it follows quite easily from the proof of the Determinacy Lemma that
our semantics has a compositionality property.
Lemma 5.3 (Compositionality Lemma). Let (V , S) be a model.
• V , S |= p if and only if p ∈ V , where p is an atom.
• V , S |= B ⊃ C if and only if V , S |= B or V , S |= C.
• V , S |= B ∨ C if and only if V , S |= B or V , S |= C.
• V , S |= B ∧ C if and only if V , S |= B and V , S |= C.
• V , S |= ¬B if and only if V , S |= B.
• V , S |= t :B if and only if S(t,B)↓.
Thus we see that our semantics for the language of LP is well-behaved. All that remains is for us to verify the correctness
of our semanticswith respect to the theory of LP; that is, we show that the formulas that are valid according to our semantics
are exactly the formulas that are provable in LP.
Theorem 5.4. A is valid if and only if A is a theorem of LP .
Proof. By induction on the length of a derivation in LP, we show that each theorem of LP is valid. In this induction, we will
make frequent use of the compositionality of our semantics (Lemma 5.3).
• LP0. Each scheme for classical propositional logic is valid.
This follows from the compositionality of our semantics by the usual truth-table arguments for classical propositional
logic.
• LP1. u :(A ⊃ B) ⊃
(
v :A ⊃ (u · v) :B
)
is valid.
Suppose (V , S) is a model satisfying V , S |= u :(A ⊃ B) and V , S |= v :A. It follows by compositionality that S(u,A ⊃ B)↓ and
S(v,A)↓. Since S is proper, it follows that S(u · v,B)↓. Applying compositionality, we then have that V , S |= (u · v) :B.
• LP2. u :A ⊃ !u :(u :A) is valid.
Suppose (V , S) is a model satisfying V , S |= u :A. It follows by compositionality that S(u,A)↓. Since S is proper, it follows
that S(!u,u :A)↓. Applying compositionality, we then have that V , S |= !u :(u :A).
• LP3. u :A ∨ s :A ⊃ (u + v) :A is valid.
Suppose (V , S) is a model satisfying V , S |= u :A ∨ s :A. It follows by compositionality that V , S |= u :A or V , S |= v :A. By
another application of compositionality, we have that S(u,A)↓ or S(v,A)↓. Since S is proper, it follows that S(u + v,A)↓.
Applying compositionality once more, we have shown that V , S |= (u + v) :A.
• LP4. u :A ⊃ A is valid.
Suppose (V , S) is a model satisfying V , S |= u :A. It follows by compositionality that S(u,A)↓. Since S is a model, we have
that S is good for V , whichmeans that S(u,A)↓ implies S(u,A) is a winning strategy under (V , S) on A. Conclusion: V , S |= A.
• Modus Ponens: if A ⊃ B and A are valid, then so is B.
15 If B∗ is a strategy on B satisfying B∗ /= S(t,B), then we could just as well have deﬁned (t :B)∗ as follows: at the -position t :B, choose the -position B;
at the -position B, play the strategy B∗ . Since the root ofTVS (t :B) will be labeled by the strategy S(t,B) (Deﬁnitions 4.9 and 4.10), the Strategy Hand Off
Rule will require True play the strategy S(t,B) at the -position B, even in the case when (t :B)∗ B /= S(t,B). So we see that the result does not depend on
the way we deﬁne (t :B)∗ on the subtreeTVS (B) ofTVS (t :B).
B. Renne / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 1015–1043 1035
Suppose |= A ⊃ B and |= A. If (V , S) is a model, then it follows from our assumptions that V , S |= A ⊃ B and V , S |= A.
Applying compositionality, we then have that V , S |= B. Since themodel (V , S)was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that
|= B.
• Constant Necessitation: if c is a constant and A is an axiom of LP, then c :A is valid.
Let (V , S) be an arbitrary model. Since S is proper, we have that S(c,A)↓. Applying compositionality, it follows that V , S |=
c :A. Since the model (V , S) was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that |= c :A.
We have thus shown that A is valid if A is a theorem of LP.
Toprove the converse,weadopt the terminology relating to thenotionof consistency asdeﬁned in theﬁrst paragraphof the
proof of Theorem4.23.We then assume thatA is not a theoremof LP. It follows that {¬A} is consistent and somaybe extended
to a maximal consistent set T . Deﬁne V := {p : p ∈ T}, where p ranges over all atoms, and then deﬁne V ′ := V ∪ {¬p : ¬p ∈ T}.
Given this particular T , this particular V , and this particular V ′, we then use the construction that begins at the second
paragraph of the proof of Theorem 4.23 to produce a proper strategy map S that is good for V . It follows from the maximal
consistency of T that A /∈ T and thus that A∗ is a winning counter-strategy under (V , S) on A by theWS Property (see the proof
of Theorem 4.23 for deﬁnitions). Applying the Determinacy Lemma (Lemma 5.1), we have shown that there is a model in
which A is not true. It follows that A is not valid if A is not a theorem of LP. 
This completes our veriﬁcation that our game semantics for LP is both correct and well-behaved.
6. Embeddings and the Internalization Theorem
The concept of extensive game with perfect informationwas introduced by von Neumann andMorgenstern [19]. Following
some of Sevenster’s notation and naming conventions [21], we deﬁne an extensive game with perfect information as a tuple
G = (N,,H, p, {ui}i∈N), where
• N is a nonempty set whose elements are called players.
•  is a nonempty set.
•H is a nonempty preﬁx-closed set of strings over the alphabet  such that there is a unique shortest string r inH. (r is
typically the empty string .)
Members ofH are called histories. A string h1 is a preﬁx of a string h if and only if there is a string h2, which may be ,
such that h = h1h2. To say thatH is preﬁx-closedmeans that if h′ is a non- preﬁx of h and h ∈H, then h′ ∈H. A string
h2 is a sufﬁx of a string h if and only if there is a string h1, which may be , such that h = h1h2. If h is a history, a ∈ , and
ha is a history, then ha is called amove at h. Notation:Ht is the subset ofH containing all terminal histories, which are
those histories h such that there is no move at h. Also, ∗ is the set of all strings over the alphabet , including .
• p is a function (H−Ht) → N that maps each non-terminal history to a player. To say that the history h is a player i
positionmeans that p(h) = i.
• ui is a functionHt → R that maps each terminal history to a payoff for player i.
G is called ﬁnite if and only if the setsN,, andH are all ﬁnite.G is two-player if and only ifN = {1, 2} and p(r) = 1 if r /∈Ht . If
G is two-player, then G iswin–loss exactly when for each h ∈Ht , we have that u1(h) = −u2(h) and that |u1(h)| = |u2(h)| = 1.
All of the extensive games with perfect information we discuss will be ﬁnite, two-player, and win–loss, so we make the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A veriﬁcation-like extensive game is an extensive gamewith perfect information that is ﬁnite, two-player, and
win–loss.
In veriﬁcation-like extensive games, players take turns at each non-terminal history h, with player p(h) choosing some
move at h. Once a terminal history is reached, the game is over, and the winner is the player whose payoff at that terminal
history is 1; the other player loses.
A strategy in a veriﬁcation-like extensive game G is a function that maps each player 1 position h to a move at h. A history
h is in accordancewith a strategy s∗ if and only if for each player 1 position h′ such that h′ is a preﬁx of hwith h′ /= h, we have
that s∗(h′) is also a preﬁx of h. To say a strategy s∗ is winning means that for every terminal history h in accordance with s∗,
we have u1(h) = 1.
We deﬁne the notion of counter-strategy in G as we just did for a strategy in G, except that the references to player 1
are all replaced by player 2. The meaning of a history in accordance with a counter-strategy is given in the same way. A
counter-strategy s* is winning if and only if for every terminal history h in accordance with s*, we have u1(h) /= 1.
Since veriﬁcation-like extensive games are ﬁnite, it follows from the Gale-Stewart Theorem that each veriﬁcation-like
extensive game has either a winning strategy or a winning counter-strategy (and not both).16
16 See Hodges’ exposition [5] of the Gale-Stewart Theorem [20].
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If we ﬁx a propositional formula A and a model (V , S), then the pebble game with explicit strategies on the game board
TVS (A) is a veriﬁcation-like extensive game.Accordingly, each instanceof theLPVeriﬁcationGameonapropositional formula
can be viewed as a veriﬁcation-like extensive game. But there is also a sense in which a veriﬁcation-like extensive game G
can be viewed as an instance of the LP Veriﬁcation Game on a propositional formula AG whose construction tree faithfully
represents the game tree of G.
Proposition 6.2. For each veriﬁcation-like extensive game
G = (N,,H, p, {ui}i∈N),
there is a propositional formula AG such that A is valid if and only if there is a winning strategy in G, a winning strategy on AG
(in an arbitrary model) is convertible to a winning strategy in G using four basic operations (deﬁned in the proof below), and a
winning strategy in G is convertible to a winning strategy on AG (in an arbitrary model) using the inverse of these four operations.
Proof. This proof argues that the game tree ofG can be faithfully represented by a formulaAG in the language of propositional
logic. For transparency of the argument, we will perform a few winning-strategy–preserving operations that modify G,
allowing us to assume that G is in a desirable form. To say that these operations are winning-strategy–preserving means
that there is a winning strategy on G if and only if there is a winning strategy on the veriﬁcation-like extensive game
that results by applying these operations in order on G. We now describe these operations and argue that each of them is
winning-strategy–preserving.
• Collapse tails until each terminal history has a tail of length 1.
The tail of a terminal history h is the longest sufﬁx h2 of h such that, if h = h1h2, then for each non- preﬁx h′ of h2, there
is at most one move to make at h1h
′. The reason h2 is called a tail: ordering h2’s non- preﬁxes h(1),h(2),h(3), . . . ,h(n),h2
by increasing length, there is exactly one move to make at each non-terminal history in the sequence
h1h
(1),h1h
(2),h1h
(3), . . . ,h1h
(n),h1h2,
so this sequence traces out a tail-like path.
If ah2 is a tail of the terminal history h1ah2, with a ∈ , then to collapse ah2 is to deﬁne the veriﬁcation-like extensive
game
G′ = (N,,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
− H′ := {h ∈H | (∀h′ ∈ ∗)(h /= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1a};
− p′(h) := p(h);
− u′
i
(h) :=
{
ui(h) if h /= h1a,
ui(h1ah2) if h = h1a.
In G′, the tail a of terminal history h1a is of length 1. Further, a strategy s∗ in G induces a strategy s′∗ in G′ that takes each
player 1 position h ∈H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) := s∗(h).
Since ah2 is the tail of h1ah2 in G, the terminal history h1ah2 in G is in accordance with a strategy s
∗ in G if and only if the
terminal history h1a in G
′ is in accordance with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by s∗. It follows that s∗ is a winning strategy
in G if and only if s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. Wemay therefore collapse tails one by one until each terminal history has
a tail of length 1, after which we are assured that there is a winning strategy in the resulting veriﬁcation-like extensive
game if and only if there was a winning strategy in the original veriﬁcation-like extensive game.
• Remove all only-child double-moves from G.
A double-move is a non-terminal history h′ that is a move at another history hwith p(h) = p(h′); h′ is said to be a double-
move at h. A only-child double-move is a double-move h′ at h such that h′ is the unique move at h. h′ is called an only-child
double-move because player p(h) has only the one move h′ at h and h′ is a double-move at h.
An only-child double-move can be removed from the game G in the following way. First, suppose h1a is an only-child
double-move, where a ∈ . We deﬁne the veriﬁcation-like extensive game
G′ = (N,,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
− H′ := {h ∈H | (∀h′ ∈ ∗)(h /= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1h′ | h1ah′ ∈H};
− p′(h) :=
{
p(h) if h /= h1h′,
p(h1ah
′) if h = h1h′;
− u′
i
(h) :=
{
ui(h) if h /= h1h′,
ui(h1ah
′) if h = h1h′.
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G′ has one fewer only-child double-move than does G. Further, a strategy s∗ in G induces a strategy s′∗ in G′ that takes
each player 1 position h ∈H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) :=
{
s∗(h) if h /= h1,
h1h2 if h = h1h′ and s∗(h1ah′) = h1ah2.
Since h1a is an only-child double-move in G, a history h1ah
′ is in accordance with a strategy s∗ in G if and only if the
history h1h
′ is in accordance with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by s∗. It follows that s∗ is a winning strategy in G if and
only if s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. So we may remove all only-child double-moves from G in this way, one by one, and
we are assured the existence of a winning strategy in the resulting veriﬁcation-like extensive game if and only if there
was a winning strategy in the original veriﬁcation-like extensive game.
Since we removed only-child double-moves from G after collapsing tails until all tails are of length 1, the veriﬁcation-like
extensive game resulting from these two operations contains no only-child double-moves and has all its tails of length 1.
• Convert each three-plus fork to a two-fork.
A history h is called a three-plus fork if and only if there are at least three moves at h, and h is called a two-fork if and only
if there are exactly two moves at h. If h1a and h1b are both moves at the three-plus fork h1, then we can reduce by one
the number of moves at h1 by deﬁning the veriﬁcation-like extensive game
G′ = (N,′,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
− For some c /∈ , let ′ :=  ∪ {c};
− H′ := {h ∈H | (∀h′ ∈ ∗)(h /= h1ah′ and h /= h1bh′)} ∪
{h1c} ∪
{h1cah′ | h1ah′ ∈H} ∪
{h1cbh′ | h1bh′ ∈H};
− p′(h) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
p(h) if h ∈H,
p(h1) if h = h1c,
p(h1ah
′) if h = h1cah′,
p(h1bh
′) if h = h1cbh′;
− u′
i
(h) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
ui(h) if h ∈ Ht ,
ui(h1ah
′) if h = h1cah′,
ui(h1bh
′) if h = h1cbh′.
There is one fewer move at history h1 in G
′ than there is at h1 in G. Further, a strategy s∗ in G induces a strategy s′∗ in G′
that takes each player 1 position h ∈H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
s∗(h) if s∗(h) /= h1a and s∗(h) /= h1b,
h1c if s
∗(h) = h1a or s∗(h) = h1b,
h1ca if h = h1c and s∗(h1) = h1a,
h1cb if h = h1c and s∗(h1) = h1b,
h1cah2 if h = h1cah′ and s∗(h1ah′) = h1ah2,
h1cbh2 if h = h1cbh′ and s∗(h1bh′) = h1bh2.
It follows from the construction of G′ that the history h1cah′ in G′ is in accordance with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by
a strategy s∗ in G if and only if the history h1ah′ in G is in accordance with s∗. The same result holds with respect to the
history h1cbh
′ in G′ and the corresponding history h1bh′ in G. We thus have that s∗ is a winning strategy in G if and only
if s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. So, by repeatedly performing this operation on three-plus forks until no more three-plus
forks remain, we produce a veriﬁcation-like extensive game in which there exists a winning strategy if and only if there
was a winning strategy in the original veriﬁcation-like extensive game.
In performing this operation after the previous two, wemade all tails of length 1, we then removed all only-child double-
moves, and we then incrementally reduced the number of moves at three-plus forks until there were nomore three-plus
forks. The resulting veriﬁcation-like extensive game thus has tails all of length 1, contains no only-child double-moves,
and contains no three-plus forks. In fact, calling a history a fork if and only if there are at least two moves at that history,
every fork in the resulting veriﬁcation-like extensive game is a two-fork.
• Incrementally reduce the degree of each two-fork parity point until no two-fork is a parity point.
A parity point is a history h1 such that there is a non-terminal move h2 at h1 satisfying p(h2) /= p(h1). h1 is called a parity
point because the player-to-move can ﬂip from p(h1) to the other of the two players. The degree of a history h is equal to
the number of non-terminal moves h′ at h such that p(h′) /= p(h). Thus a history of nonzero degree is a parity point.
Assume that h1 is a two-fork parity point and that h1a is a non-terminal history with p(h1a) /= p(h1), where a ∈ . We
decrease by one the degree of h1 by adding a double-move between h1 and h1a. To do this, we deﬁne the veriﬁcation-like
extensive game
G′ = (N,′,H′, p′, {u′i}i∈N) :
− For some b /∈ , let ′ :=  ∪ {b};
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− H′ := {h ∈H | (∀h′ ∈ ∗)(h /= h1ah′)} ∪
{h1b} ∪
{h1bah′ | h1ah′ ∈H};
− p′(h) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
p(h) if h ∈H,
p(h1) if h = h1b,
p(h1ah
′) if h = h1bah′;
− u′
i
(h) :=
{
ui(h) if h /= h1bah′,
ui(h1ah
′) if h = h1bah′.
The degree of h1 in G
′ is one less than the degree of h1 in G. Further, a strategy s∗ in G induces a strategy s′∗ in G′ that
takes each player 1 position h ∈H′ to a move at h:
s′∗(h) :=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
s∗(h) if s∗(h) /= h1a,
h1b if s
∗(h) = h1a,
h1ba if h = h1b,
h1bah2 if h = h1bah′ and s∗(h1ah′) = h1ah2.
It follows from our construction that the history h1bah
′ in G′ is in accordance with the strategy s′∗ in G′ induced by a
strategy s∗ in G if and only if the history h1ah′ in G is in accordance with s∗. We thus have that s∗ is a winning strategy in
G if and only if s′∗ is a winning strategy in G′. Proceeding in this way, we incrementally reduce the degree of each two-
fork parity point until there are no more two-fork parity points, and we are assured that the resulting veriﬁcation-like
extensive game has a winning strategy if and only if the original extensive game had awinning strategy. Notice that since
we only perform this operation at two-fork parity points, we never introduce only-child double-moves.
So after performing the operations above in order, we end up with a veriﬁcation-like extensive game satisfying each of the
following properties:
1. every fork is a two-fork,
2. every terminal history is a move at a two-fork (because all tails are of length 1),
3. no two-fork is a parity point, and
4. there are no only-child double-moves.
We may thus assume without loss of generality that G satisﬁes each of these properties.
We now proceed with our construction of the formula AG , the formula in the statement of this proposition. First, call a
terminal history positive in G if and only if it has an even number of ancestors that are parity points; call a terminal history
is negative G if and only if it is not positive in G. Working our way backward from terminal histories, we deﬁne a function f
that takes each history h to a formula f (h) according to the following case analysis.
• If h is a positive terminal history, then
f (h) :=
{ if u1(h) = 1,
⊥ if u1(h) /= 1.
• If h is a negative terminal history, then
f (h) :=
{⊥ if u1(h) = 1,
 if u1(h) /= 1.
• If h is a parity point (and hence non-terminal), then
f (h) := ¬f (h′),
where h′ is the unique move at h (uniqueness follows from Properties 1 and 3).
• If h is neither a parity point nor a terminal history, then
f (h) := f (h1) ∨ f (h2),
where h1 and h2 are the two moves at h. To see why there are exactly two moves at h, ﬁrst notice that there is a move
h1 at h because h is non-terminal. Next observe that h1 is a double-move because h is not a parity point. But Property
4 implies that h1 cannot be an only-child double-move, so h is a fork. Applying Property 1, it follows that h is in fact a
two-fork.
In this way, f maps each history to a formula, and we let the formula AG in the statement of this proposition be the formula
f (r), where r is the unique shortest string inH.
AG is letterless, which means that each atomic formula appearing in AG is a propositional constant. It thus follows that
the winning (counter-)strategy on AG in LP Veriﬁcation is independent of any model (V , S). Further, AG is in the language of
propositional logic,which implies thatwedonotneedanyof the special featuresof LPVeriﬁcation—PropositionalVeriﬁcation
will do—but we will need LP Veriﬁcation later when we apply the Internalization Theorem, so we will nonetheless use LP
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Veriﬁcation. What remains is to show that AG is valid if and only if there is a winning strategy in G. To do this, we will argue
that f is a tree-isomorphism betweenH andT(AG), by which we mean that three conditions are satisﬁed. We list each
condition along with an argument as to why the condition is true.
1. f (r) = AG , where r is the unique shortest string inH.
This condition is satisﬁed by our deﬁnition of AG .
2. If h′ is a move at h, then f (h′) is an immediate subformula instance of f (h).
This follows by inspection of the way we deﬁned f on each history h.
3. If B is an immediate subformula instance of f (h), then there is a move h′ at h such that f (h′) = B.
By our deﬁnition of f , that the formula f (h) has immediate subformula instances implies that f (h) is either a disjunction
or a negation. If f (h) is a disjunction, then f (h) was deﬁned by forming the disjunction of the formulas f (h1) and f (h2),
where h1 and h2 are moves at h. If f (h) is a negation, then f (h) was deﬁned by forming the negation of the formula f (h3),
where h3 is the unique move at h. So in either case, we have for each immediate subformula instance B of f (h) a move h
′
at h such that f (h′) = B.
We may thus view f as a bijection between histories and subformula instances of AG , so it makes sense to talk of the history
f−1(B) obtained as the inverse image of f on the subformula instance B of AG . It follows that terminal histories are in one-to-
one correspondence with leaves ofT(AG). Observe that for an immediate subformula instance C of a subformula instance B
of AG , we have that B and C are of opposite polarity (as subformula instances of AG) if and only if f
−1(B) is a parity point. We
therefore have that an atomic subformula instance p of AG is positive in AG if and only if f
−1(p) is positive inG. Looking back to
howwe speciﬁed the leaves inT(AG) as images of terminal histories, it then follows that player 1 wins at terminal history h
in G if and only if True wins the play of AG ending on f (h) in the LP Veriﬁcation Game on AG . It then follows immediately that
there is a winning strategy in G if and only if there is a winning strategy on AG (in an arbitrary model). Since AG is letterless,
it follows that there is a winning strategy in G if and only if AG is valid. 
So the proof of Proposition 6.2 deﬁnes a winning-strategy–preserving embedding that maps each veriﬁcation-like exten-
sive game G to a letterless propositional formula AG . Now let us assume for a moment that there is a winning strategy in G,
and so AG is valid and hence provable in LP. Applying the Internalization Theorem (Theorem 2.4), there is a term t containing
no variables such that t :AG is also a theorem of LP. We now show how the inductive construction of t in the proof of the
Internalization Theorem tells us how to build a winning strategy A∗
G
on AG , which we may view as the interpretation of t in
the LP Veriﬁcation Game.
• Suppose we used a constant c to internalize the LP axiom B.
We proved in Theorem 5.4 that each axiom has a winning strategy, so choose a winning strategy B∗ on B (any will do).
Take B∗ as the interpretation of c.
• Suppose we used the term u · v to internalize the conclusion C obtained from Modus Ponens on B ⊃ C and B, where we
already constructed terms u and v such that both u :(B ⊃ C) and v :B are theorems.
We have already determined a winning strategy (B ⊃ C)∗ on B ⊃ C that interprets u and a winning strategy B∗ on B that
interprets v. Since each of (B ⊃ C)∗ and B∗ is a winning strategy, it is not hard to see that (B ⊃ C)∗ C is a winning strategy
on C, so take (B ⊃ C)∗ C as the interpretation of u · v.
• Suppose we used the term !c to internalize the conclusion c :B obtained from Constant Necessitation on the LP axiom B.
We have already determined a winning strategy B∗ on B interpreting c. But it then follows that any strategy on c :B is
winning. So choose an arbitrary strategy on c :B to interpret !c.
In thisway,weobtain awinning strategyA∗
G
onAG that interprets t. However, since the game tree ofG is essentially the sameas
the LP Veriﬁcation Game tree on AG , the winning strategy A∗G induces a winning strategy s
∗ on G. Here the word “essentially”
is used to indicate that we manipulated G during the proof of Proposition 6.2 in our construction of AG; however, these
manipulations are invertible, which allows us to convert the winning strategy on the manipulated G to a winning strategy
on the original, non-manipulated G. In this way, the Internalization Theorem provides a means of constructing winning
strategies on winnable instances of veriﬁcation-like extensive games.
6.1. Example: obtaining winning strategies in Nim
The well-known game of Nim [18] may be viewed as a veriﬁcation-like extensive game. The initial setup for a play of Nim
consists of three separate piles of stones (or other objects of any kind), with each pile having ﬁnite size. A move consists of
selecting one pile and then removing any nonzero number of stones from that pile, leaving the other two piles alone. The
removed stones are then discarded, as they are no longer part of the game. Two players take alternate turns moving in this
way until all stones are removed. The player that picks up the last stone is the winner, and so the player that has no stone to
pick up is the loser.
We represent a Nim instance as a triple (a, b, c) of non-negative integers. The Nim instance (a′, b′, c′) stands in one-move
relation to theNim instance (a, b, c),written (a, b, c) →1 (a′, b′, c′), if andonly if theprimed triple is obtained fromtheunprimed
triple by one legalmove in the Nim game. Notice that no Nim instance stands in one-move relation to (0, 0, 0) because (0, 0, 0)
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marks the end of every play of Nim. We write (a, b, c) →* (a′, b′, c′) if and only if the Nim instance (a′, b′, c′) may be obtained
from the Nim instance (a, b, c) by zero or more legal moves in the Nim game, so →* is just the reﬂexive-transitive closure of
→1. A Nim instance (a, b, c)may be viewed as the veriﬁcation-like extensive game G(a, b, c) = (N,,H, p, {ui}i∈N), where the
components of this tuple are given as follows.
• N := {1, 2}.
•  := {(a′, b′, c′) | (a, b, c) →* (a′, b′, c′)}.
•H is deﬁned as follows. First, setH0 := {(a, b, c)}. OnceHk is deﬁned, deﬁneHk+1 as the set
{h(a1, b1, c1)(a′, b′, c′) | h(a1, b1, c1) ∈Hk and (a1, b1, c1) →1 (a′, b′, c′)},
where h is a metavariable ranging over ∗. Finally, letH := ⋃a+b+ci=0 Hi.• p is deﬁned as follows. For each history h, deﬁne the length of h as the number of elements of  contained in h. Example:
in G(2, 1, 0), the non-terminal history
(2, 1, 0)(1, 1, 0)(1, 0, 0)
has length three. Now if h is a non-terminal history, then set p(h) := 1 if the length of h is odd; otherwise, if the length of
h is even, then set p(h) := 2.
• u1 is deﬁned as follows. For each terminal history h, set u1(h) := 1 if the length of h is even; set u1(h) := −1 if the length
of h is odd.
• u2 is deﬁned as follows. For each terminal history h, set u2(h) := 1 if the length of h is odd; set u2(h) := −1 if the length
of h is even.
Now that we have seen how a Nim instance may be viewed as a veriﬁcation-like extensive game, we will work out an
example that shows how to use the Internalization Theorem to construct a winning strategy on the winnable Nim instance
(2, 1, 0).
First observe that player 1 can guarantee himself a win in G(2, 1, 0) if and only if his move at the history (2, 1, 0) is
(2, 1, 0)(1, 1, 0). This move corresponds to the ﬁrst player picking up one stone from the ﬁrst pile. The second player then
picks up one stone from the ﬁrst or the second pile, leaving the ﬁrst player to pick up the last stone for the win.
So there is indeed a winning strategy in G(2, 1, 0). We will now embed G(2, 1, 0) into the LP Veriﬁcation Game according
to the construction in the proof of Proposition 6.2.Wewill then see how the Internalization Theorem allows us to extract the
winning strategy in G(2, 1, 0). Initially, G(2, 1, 0) has the form of the tree in Fig. 7. We then perform in order the operations on
G(2, 1, 0) described in the proof of Proposition 6.2. (As we proceed, we will use the terminology from this proof. The reader
may ﬁnd it convenient to keep track of where we are in the bulleted list at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 6.2,
which itemizes these operations in order and provides formal deﬁnitions of the terminology.)
The ﬁrst operation calls for us to collapse tails until each terminal history’s tail is of length 1. The result of this operation
is the tree in Fig. 8.
The next operation calls for us to remove each only-child double-move; however, the tree in Fig. 8 does not have only-
child double-moves, so this operation causes no change in the tree. Moving to the next operation, we are called to convert
three-plus forks to two-forks. The result of this operation is the tree in Fig. 9.
The next operation calls for us to ensure that no two-fork is a parity point. The result of this operation is the tree in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 10, we have that every fork is a two-fork, that every terminal history is a move at a two-fork, that no two-fork is
a parity point, and that there are no only-child double-moves. We are led to the formula construction tree in Fig. 11 by the
construction in the proof of Proposition 6.2.
The formula at the root of the Fig. 11 construction tree is the formula AG(2,1,0). This formula is a theorem of propositional
logic (and hence of LP). Here is a proof of AG(2,1,0).
1. ⊥ ⊃ ⊥
by Axiom ⊥ ⊃ A
2. (⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ (⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
by Axiom (A ⊃ C) ⊃ ((B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ∨ B ⊃ C))
3. ⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥
by Modus Ponens 1,2
4. (⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥)
by Axiom (A ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬A
5. ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥)
by Modus Ponens 3,4
6. ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥ ∨ ) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥))
by Axiom A ⊃ B ∨ A
7. (¬(⊥ ∨ ) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥)
by Modus Ponens 5,6
Here is the above proof internalized in LP.
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Fig. 7. A tree representing G(2, 1, 0) with players 1 and 2.
Fig. 8. The tree of Fig. 7 after tails are collapsed to length 1.
Fig. 9. This tree results from converting three-plus forks to two-forks in the tree of Fig. 8. This conversion introduced the new node n1.
Fig. 10. This tree results from introducing double-moves (the nodes n2 and n3) into the tree of Fig. 9 so that no two-fork is a parity point.
Fig. 11. The formula construction tree of AG(2,1,0) , a construction tree created from the tree in Fig. 10 according to the proof of Proposition 6.2.
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1′. a :(⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
2′. b :((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ((⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ (⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥))
3′. ((b · a) · a) :(⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥)
4′. c :((⊥ ∨ ⊥ ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥))
5′. (c · ((b · a) · a)) :(¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥))
6′. d :(¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥ ∨ ) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥)))
7′. (d · (c · ((b · a) · a))) :((¬(⊥ ∨ ) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥))
To determine the winning strategy described by the term d · (c · ((b · a) · a)), it sufﬁces to determine the winning strategy
described by d on the axiom it labels in line 6′. This strategy is given as follows:
• map ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥) ⊃ ((¬(⊥ ∨ ) ∨ ⊥) ∨ ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥)) to its consequent, which is the formula AG(2,1,0);
• map AG(2,1,0) to its immediate subformula instance ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥);
• map ¬(⊥ ∨ ⊥) to its immediate subformula instance ⊥ ∨ ⊥;
• map thosepositive subformulas not alreadyhandled in oneof the three items above to an arbitrary immediate subformula
instance.
And so the strategy on AG(2,1,0) described by d · (c · ((b · a) · a)) consists of the strategy d restricted to its consequent AG(2,1,0),
a strategy consisting of just the last three of the four bullets above. This strategy on AG(2,1,0) speciﬁes a strategy on the tree
in Fig. 10, which induces a strategy on the tree in Fig. 9 that calls for the move “at (2, 1, 0), choose (1, 1, 0)” (among other
moves). The strategy on the tree in Fig. 9 then induces a strategy on the tree of Fig. 8, which itself induces a strategy on the
tree of Fig. 7 that calls for the following moves (among others):
• at (2, 1, 0), choose (1, 1, 0);
• at (1, 0, 0), choose (0, 0, 0);
• at (0, 1, 0), choose (0, 0, 0);
We see immediately that this is indeed a winning strategy in G(2, 1, 0). And as we had hoped, this strategy on the tree of Fig.
7 corresponds to the following strategy for the Nim instance (2, 1, 0): “remove one stone from the ﬁrst pile, wait for the other
player to respond, and then remove the remaining stone.”
7. Conclusion
Wehave deﬁned a game semantics for LP inwhich terms are interpreted aswinning strategies on the formulas they label.
This interpretation allows us to view LP as a logic of explicit strategies for its own veriﬁcation game. Of particular interest
is the Internalization Theorem (Theorem 2.4), which we may read as asserting that LP describes a winning strategy on each
of its theorems. Notice that there is no requirement for LP to be complete with respect to the class of winning strategies in
its Veriﬁcation Game (meaning that for a ﬁxed model (V , S), if s∗ is a winning strategy on a formula A, then there is a term t
such that S(t,A) = s∗).
It may be of interest to determine how such strategic completeness can be imposed, whether semantically (perhaps
a trivial matter of deﬁnition) or syntactically (via a language extension). Of course, such an imposition ought not disturb
the Internalization Theorem, since it is this theorem that lets us exploit the winning-strategy–preserving embedding of
veriﬁcation-like extensive games into LP Veriﬁcation in order to construct winning strategies on winnable instances of
veriﬁcation-like extensive games. (We showed how this is done for the Nim instance (2, 1, 0).)
But it might be the case that strategic incompleteness is of greater interest. In particular, by carefully managing those
winning strategies that terms may express—something we might call expressivity of strategies—our LP Veriﬁcation Game
might be extended to the various (multi-)modal extensions of LP [7–11,14,15]. Such extensions would have a player who is
to make amove at the modal formulaA choose a term t and then continue playing as if the current formula were t :A. Thus
the set
{s∗ | (∃t)(S(t,A)↓ and S(t,A) = s∗)}
of strategies on A expressible by a term would determine the modal theory for the modality . Such a study of term
expressivity seems promising as a direction for research aimed at deﬁning a game semantics for all of Justiﬁcation Logic.
Since LP Veriﬁcation is an extension of the pebble game, a game that is extended and andmassaged to provide semantics
for many logics [5], it would be interesting to see how LP Veriﬁcation might itself be extended or massaged so as to
handle interesting fragments of more general frameworks (such as Computability Logic [22]) or other frameworks whose
underlying logics are essentially different than that of classical propositional logic (examples include IF logic [3] and the
Basic Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs [23]). But we leave these investigations for future work.
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